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STATE OF THE ART EVIDENCE IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY
SUITS IN MARYLAND
I. INTRODUCTION
A court's decision to admit state of the art evidence in a prod-
ucts liability suit often amounts to a fundamental policy choice.' Re-
gardless of whether a claim is brought in strict liability or negli-
gence, state of the art evidence can have a profound effect on a
case.2 Indeed, when courts allow state of the art evidence to be in-
troduced in strict liability cases, they are essentially grafting negli-
gence principles onto strict liability theory.3 Absent direction from
1. See 6 STUART M. SPEISER ET AL, THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 18:165, at 341
(1989) (citing Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 545-49
(N.J. 1982)); Sheila L. Birnbaum & Barbara Wrubel, 'State of the Art' and Strict
Products Liability, 21 TORT & INS. L.J. 30, 31 (1985). According to some
commentators:
[E]normous difficulties [persist] around the country, as courts seek
to maintain a distinction between negligence and strict liability while
avoiding the lure of absolute liability. In each of these cases, a critical
issue for determination was the proper role, if any, of 'state of the
art' evidence in a strict liability cause of action.
Id. at 31.
2. See ACandS, Inc. v. Asner, 344 Md. 155, 165-68, 686 A.2d 250, 254-56 (1996)
(discussing the critical role of state of the art evidence in strict liability and
negligence); ACandS, Inc. v. Godwin, 340 Md. 334, 367-92, 667 A.2d 116, 132-
44 (1995) (noting the importance of state of the art evidence in determining
whether to affirm a trial court's award of punitive damages); Eagle-Picher In-
dus. v. Balbos, 326 Md. 179, 194-97, 604 A.2d 445, 452-53 (1992) (relying on
the plaintiff's state of the art evidence to affirm the trial court's award of dam-
ages in a strict liability failure to warn case).
3. See 3 Louis R FRUMER & MELVIN I. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 18.03[4], at
18-71 (1998); Gary C. Robb, A Practical Approach to Use of State of the Art Evi-
dence in Strict Liability Cases, 77 Nw. U. L REv. 1, 13-16 (1982); see also Aaron
Twerski, A Moderate and Restrained Federal Product Liability Bill: Targeting the Crisis
Areas for Resolution, 18 U. MiCH.J.L. REFORM 575, 591-92 (1985) ("Although the
formulation of these 'state of the art' rules differs from jurisdiction to jurisdic-
tion, in the end for all practical purposes, the defense reinstates the negli-
gence standard as the operative rule in all cases where it applies."); Alan
Calnan, Note, Perpetuating Negligence Principles in Strict Products Liability: The Use
of State of the Art Concepts in Design Cases, 36 SYRACUSE L. REv. 797, 800 (1985)
(observing that state of the art evidence injects negligence principles into
strict liability, thereby blurring the distinction between the two theories); cf.
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the legislature, on the issue of state of the art evidence, courts must
sift through the common law of torts, trends in American jurispru-
dence, and overall notions of fairness and equity to decide which
theory to apply and, ultimately, should bear responsibility for defec-
tive products.4
Unfortunately, an examination of court decisions on state of
the art evidence will place even the most learned jurist in a state of
confusion. 5 Only a small fraction of the case law can be accurately
characterized as well-settled. 6 Indeed, even referring to this body of
law as evidence is arguably misleading, because it constitutes an af-
firmative defense in certain jurisdictions.7 While state of the art pre-
W. Page Keeton, Products Liability--Inadequacy of Information, 48 TEx. L. PEv.
398, 407 (1969) (noting that the conduct required for strict liability is similar
to the conduct under a negligence theory); John W. Wade, On the Nature of
Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 834-35 (1973) (noting that
strict liability is seen as a form of negligence).
4. SeeJohn F. Vargo, The Emperor's New Clothes: The American Law Institute Adorns a
'New Cloth' for Section 402A Products Liability Design Defects - A Survey of the
States Reveals a Different Weave, 26 U.'MEM. L. REv. 493, 806 (1996) (discussing
the significant difference between the plaintiff's burden in strict liability and
negligence); David J. Molnar, Note, Should Loss-Spreading Be the Paramount Pub-
lic Policy Rationale for the Imposition of Strict Products Liability? A Study of the Inter-
section of Strict Products Liability & Landlord-Tenant Law, 22J. CORP. L. 93,99-104
(1996) (discussing reasons for imposing Itrict liability); Patricia M. Monaghan,
Note, Supreme Court Permits Design Defect Claims in Both Strict Liability and Negli-
gence Brooks v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 26 N.M. L. REv. 629, 635-37 (1996).
5. The comments to the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF TORTS: PRODUCTS
LtABiLrry highlight the confusion that courts have created by defining state of
the art in various ways; noting "[t]he confusion brought about by these vari-
ous definitions is unfortunate." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF TORTS:
PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. d. (1997). Louis Frumer and Melvin Friedman,
authors of an extensive multi-volume treatise on products liability, have ex-
plained: "State of the art' is one of the more confused and confusing con-
cepts in products liability law." 3 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, § 18.03
[1], at 18-46.2. For a penetrating examination of state of the art evidence with
various jurisdictional approaches, see id § 18.03, at 18-46.2 to 18-72.
6. See W. Page Keeton, The Meaning of Defect in Product Liability Law-A Review of
Basic Principles, 45 Mo. L. REv. 579, 594 (1980) (noting multiple definitions
employed by various courts); Robb, supra note 3, at 2 (describing the courts'
confusiorr and inconsistency in applying this term).
7. See Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 438 n.8, 601 A.2d 633, 641 n.8
(1992) (discussing Charles C. Marvel, Annotation, Strict Products Liability: Liabil-
ity for Failure to Warn as Dependent on Defendant's Knowledge of Danger, 33 A.LIR
4th 368 (1981)); Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., The Louisiana Products Liability Act:
Making Sense of It All 49 LA L. REv. 629, 670-71 (1989) (discussing the use of
state of the art as an affirmative defense); Steven P. Zabel & Jeffrey A. Eyres,
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cedent in Maryland is certainly more established today than it was a
mere decade ago,' the advent of the Restatement (Third) of the Law of
Torts: Products Liability and its abandonment of strict liability for all
products liability cases, except those involving manufacturing de-
fects,9 may prove troubling.'0 This Comment attempts to clear up
some of the confusion created by state of the art evidentiary issues.
Particular emphasis is placed on Maryland products liability law;
however, due to the infancy of the subject, this Comment necessa-
rily resorts to extraterritorial approaches for scenarios that Maryland
courts have not yet addressed. Part II begins by defining state of the
art and explaining how it is applied in different contexts.' Part III
sets forth the standards of decision-making that underlie each cause
of action in which state of the art evidence issues arise.'2 Part IV de-
tails the relevance of state of the art evidence in products liability
suits grounded in negligence. Part V addresses the most controver-
sial context in which state of the art evidence may be relied upon-
strict liability cases.' 3 Necessarily, this Comment provides greater dis-
cussion on duty to warn issues, because they form the most com-
mon basis for modern products liability cases.' 4 Part VI discusses
Conflict of Law Issues in Multistate Phoduct Liability Class Actions, 19 HAMuNE L
REv. 429, 441-42 (1996) (noting the responses of several different jurisdictions
to use of the state of the art as an affirmative defense). See generally Robb,
supra note 3, at 1 (discussing the confusion surrounding the application of
state of the art in products liability cases and proposing a solution).
8. SeeJOEL A. DEWEY ET AL, PRODUcrs LLABILrTy LAw MANUAL 131 (1990) (observ-
ing that as recently as 1990, "the Court of Appeals of Maryland has not yet ad-
dressed the admissibility of state of the art evidence under any products liabil-
ity theory"); Edward S. Digges, Jr. & John G. Billmyre, Product Liability in
Maryland: Traditional and Emerging Theories of Recovery and Defense, 16 U. BALT.
L REv. 1, 52 (1986) (noting that as of 1986, the court of appeals had not ad-
dressed the use of state of the art evidence).
9. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF TORTS: PRODUCrS LIABILrIy § 2 (1997);
William E.Westerbeke, The Sources of Controversy in the New Restatement of Prod-
ucts Liability: Strict Liability Versus Products Liability, 8 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POLY. 1, 8
(1998) ("By adopting a negligence standard for design defects and warning
defects, the new Restatement shifts away from a rigid 'strict liability' view of
section section 402A and more toward the "products liability' view.").
10. See 3 FRUMER & FRiEDMAN, supra note 3, § 18.03[2], at 18-59.
11. See infra notes 18-52 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 53-78 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 188-217 and accompanying text.
14. See M. Stuart Madden, The Duty to Warn in Products Liability: Contours and Criti-
cism, 89 W. VA. L. REv. 221, 222 (1987); Lars Noah, The Imperative to Warn: Dis-
entangling the "Right to Know" fiom the "Need to Know" about Consumer Product
Hazards, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 293, 344 (1994) (noting that in products liability
1998]
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ACandS, Inc. v. Asner,15 a recent case decided by the Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland that addressed a state of the art evidentiary is-
sue. 16 Part VII examines the Asner court's opinion in light of the
preceding analysis. 7 This Comment concludes with a general sum-
mary of several trends that Maryland case law appears to support
when dealing with state of the art evidence.
II. WHAT IS STATE OF THE ART?
One difficulty in dealing with issues of state of the art evidence
is determining what state of the art actually means.'8 State of the art
has been defined in various ways by different jurisdictions. 9 Even
within the same jurisdiction, there are inconsistencies as to what
state of the art encompasses.20 In Maryland, "'[s]tate of the art in-
cludes all of the available knowledge on a subject at a given time,
and this includes scientific, medical, engineering, and any other
knowledge that may be available.' 2' The evidentiary concept of
litigation, failure to warn cases are displacing the traditional design and manu-
facturing defect causes of action).
15. 344 Md. 155, 686 A.2d 250 (1996).
16. See infra notes 411-30 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 441-48 and accompanying text.
18. See 3 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN. supra note 3, § 18.03[2], at 18-47 (discussing the flu-
idity of courts' definitions of state of the art evidence); Robb, supra note 3, at
3-4 (explaining that courts often confuse state of the art evidence with ex-
isting trade standards, compliance with statutes or regulations, or feasibility
considerations); Rexford M. Reynolds & Michele Sunahara, Note, Johnson v.
Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc.: The Death of State of the Art Evidence in Strict Products
Liability Cases Involving Inherently Dangerous Products, 11 U. HAW. L. REV. 175,
184 (1989) (noting that courts neither define nor apply state of the art evi-
dence uniformly).
19. See Edward C. Sobota, Note, Product Liability Reform Proposal: The State of the Art
Defense, 43 ALB. L. REv. 941, 945-46 (1979) (discussing the spectrum of defini-
tions used for state of the art evidence).
20. See 3 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, § 18.03 [1], at 18-46.2.
21. ACandS, Inc. v. Asner, 344 Md. 155, 165, 686 A.2d 250, 254 (1996) (quoting
Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 782 F.2d 1156, 1164 (4th Cir. 1986));
see also United States Gypsum Co. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 336 Md. 145, 165, 647
A.2d 405, 415 (1994) ("[State of the art evidence] includes not only discover-
ies by the general scientific community or discoveries reflected in the general
scientific literature, but also the discoveries by scientists or experts employed
by other manufacturers."); Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 434-
35, 601 A.2d 633, 639-40 (1992) ("[E]vidence concerning the presence or ab-
sence of knowledge in the expert community is called 'state of the art' evi-
dence."); cf Babylon v. Scruton, 215 Md. 299, 304, 138 A.2d 375, 378 (1958)
("[A manufacturer] will be held to the skill of an expert in that business and
to an expert's knowledge of the arts, materials, and processes. Thus he must
[Vol. 28
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state of the art has developed through Maryland case law. 22 How-
ever, several states have codified what constitutes state of the art evi-
dence. 23 Regardless of whether a state codifies its approach or devel-
ops it through case law, there are two distinct views of how state of
the art may be used by litigants. First, state of the art forms a cate-
gory of evidence. 24 Second, state of the art creates an affirmative de-
fense in certain contexts. 25 However, this fundamental distinction is
often blurred by courts when ruling on a state of the art issue.26 Ad-
dressing each view in separate analysis provides useful insight into
Maryland's approach to state of the art issues.
A. State of the Art-Defense or Merely Evidence
Several states have provided for a state of the art defense by
way of statute. 27 The treatment of state of the art as a defense 28 var-
ies depending on each statute.29 Despite the differing approaches of
keep reasonably abreast of scientific knowledge and discoveries touching his
product...." (quoting 2 FOWLER V. HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF
TORTS § 28.4 (1956))).
22. See Zenobia, 325 Md. at 439 n.8, 601 A.2d at 641 n.8.
23. See AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 39.9-39.11 (Timothy E. Travers et al.
eds., 1987) (noting several statutory approaches to state of the art evidence).
24. See infra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
26. See 3 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, § 18.03[1], at 18-46.2 (noting that state
of the art "is both a category of evidence and an affirmative defense, although
at times, in some judicial opinions, it is difficult to differentiate between the
two"); Reynolds & Sunahara, supra note 18, at 184.
27. See 3 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, § 18.03[4], at 18-59 to 18-61 (discuss-
ing state of the art statutory defenses to product liability actions in Arizona,
Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Missouri, Nebraska, and New Jersey and rebuttable
presumptions in Colorado and Kentucky); Michael A. Pope & Michale K.
Batosz, "State of the Art": Is There Any Life Left in the Defense?, 316 PLI/Lrr 187,
202-04 (1986) (discussing Arizona, Colorado, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Indi-
ana statutes that provide state of the art defenses).
28. In some jurisdictions, the state of the art may provide an affirmative defense,
thereby fully relieving a manufacturer of liability. See 1 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN,
supra note 3, § 8.0416], at 8-203 to 8-212; PRODUCTS LIABiUny PRACTICE GUIDE §
15.05[3], at 15-121 to 15-122 (John F. Vargo et al. eds., 1998).
29. Compare ARiz. REV. STAT. § 12-683(1) (1998) (relieving a manufacturer of liabil-
ity for a strict liability claim for defective design or manufacture if it proves
that "the plans or designs for the product or the methods and techniques of
manufacturing, inspecting, testing, and labeling the product conformed with
the state of the art at the time the product was first sold by the defendant"),
with COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-403(l)(a) (1998) (providing a rebuttable
presumption in strict products liability for sellers and manufacturers if the
product conformed to the state of the art at the time of sale).
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each statute, courts and commentators will often refer to these stat-
utes collectively as "the state of the art defense." 3° While all of the
statutes consider state of the art evidence relevant, the overwhelm-
ing majority do not permit the evidence to establish an absolute de-
fense. 3 1 It is perhaps more accurate to view the majority of statutes
that deal with state of the art as codifying an element that may be
considered when assessing a manufacturer's liability.3 2 Indeed, one
commentator has concluded that labeling these statutory applica-
tions of state of the art evidence as "a defense is in general a mis-
nomer."3 3 In states that have codified the appropriate treatment of
state of the art, courts undoubtedly have more guidance on. such
matters than do courts in their sister states that must take a com-
mon law approach to resolving the same issues. Maryland has not
codified a state of the art defense. Moreover, recent decisions indi-
cate a reluctance to creating a common law state of the art de-
fense. 34 Instead, state of the art is treated as evidence that forms
part of the plaintiff's case-in-chief.35 Defendants may use state of the
art evidence under certain causes of action, not as an absolute de-
30. Owens-Illinois Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 438 n.8, 601 A.2d 633, 641 n.8
(1992) (noting the reference to state of the art "defenses" made by numerous
courts).
31. See 1 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, § 8.0416], at 8-203 to 8-212 (discussing
the various statutory approaches).
32. The RESTATEMENT (THIRD) appears to view this as the appropriate approach.
Section 2, comment d discusses state of the art and notes that "[w]hen a
defendant demonstrates that its product design was the safest in use at the
time of sale, it may be difficult for the plaintiff to prove that an alternative de-
sign could have been practically adopted .... While such evidence is admissi-
ble, it is not necessarily dispositive." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF
TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILTY § 2 cmt. d (1997). Recently, Aaron Twerski, one of
the reporters for the American Law Institute, explained why the RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) considers state of the art evidence relevant, but not conclusive. Twer-
ski explained:
If a plaintiff can suggest to a court an alternative design, the fact that
the proposed design has not been adopted for commercial use or no
one has even thought about adopting it, if its sound and sensible, it
ought to be admitted into evidence. And if, a jury finds that the
product is defective, so be it.
Aaron D. Twerski, In Defense of the Products Liability Restatement: Part 1, 8 KAN.
J.L. & PUB. POL. 27, 29 (1998).
33. Robb, supra note 3, at 7.
34. See Zenobia, 325 Md. at 438 n.8, 601 A.2d at 641 n.8 (rejecting the use of the
state of the art as an affirmative defense); see also DEWEY ET AL, supra note 8,
at 131.
35. See Zenobia, 325 Md. at 438 n.8, 601 A.2d at 641 n.8.
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fense, but as evidence to rebut the plaintiff's evidence.36 A court's
consideration of state of the art evidence turns on its relevance. 37
Conceptually, the relevance of industry standards or customs will
often parallel the relevance of state of the art evidence. 38 In Mary-
land, however, it would be imprecise to draw conclusions as to state
of the art evidence from precedent addressing the admissibility of
industry standards or customs.
B. State of the Art Distinguished fom Industry Standards
The close relationship between state of the art evidence and ev-
idence of industry standards has resulted in some confusion among
courts and commentators. 39 While some courts have concluded that
state of the art evidence is equivalent to evidence of industry stan-
dards,4° the majority view, adopted by Maryland, 4' is that they are
two distinct concepts. 42 One useful method of distinguishing be-
tween the two standards is to think of industry standards as what is
actually done by the industry and state of the art as what can be
done by the industry.43 Whereas state of the art evidence includes
36. See 1 M. STUART MADDEN, PRODUCTS LLABiuT § 12.13, at 530 (1988).
37. See, e.g., FED. R EVID. 401 (defining relevant evidence under federal law); FED.
R EVID. 402 (forbidding the admission of irrelevant evidence under federal
law); MD. R EVID. 5-401 (defining relevant evidence under state law); MD. R.
EVID. 5-402 (forbidding the admission of irrelevant evidence under state law).
38. See 3 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, § 18.03[2], at 18-50 to 18-54 (discuss-
ing various jurisdictional approaches to state of the art evidence that view it
equivalent or parallel to industry standards).
39. See 3 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, § 18.03[2], at 18-52 to 18-54 (noting
that some jurisdictions consider evidence of industry standards equivalent to
state of the art evidence); Robb, supra note 3, at 4, 33 n.10 (noting several
courts' confusion between state of the art evidence and evidence of industry
standards).
40. See 3 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, § 18.03[2], at 18-52 to 18-54 (discussing
Lane v. Amsted Indus., 779 S.W.2d 754 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); Sexton By Sexton
v. Bell Helmets, Inc., 926 F.2d 331 (4th Cir. 1991) (applying Kentucky law)); 2
J. D. LEE & BARRY A. LINDAHL, MODERN TORT LAW: LIABILITY & LITIGATION §
4 27.77, at 736 (1989).
41. See Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp., 782 F.2d 1156, 1164 (4th Cir. 1986)
(distinguishing state of the art evidence and industry standard evidence under
Maryland law).
42. See Pope & Batosz, supra note 27, at 190; 2 LEE & LINDAHL, supra note 40, §
27.77, at 736.
43. See Lohrmann, 782 F.2d at 1164; see also 3 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, §
18.03[2], at 1850 ("[State of the art evidence] is distinguishable from evidence
of industry custom, here at issue. 'Custom' refers to the usual practice of the
manufacturer, that is, what is done; 'state of the art' refers to the technologi-
1998]
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all product-related knowledge,"4 evidence of industry standards con-
cerns the actual practices of the participants in a given industry.45
Thus, adhering to the state of the art places a greater burden on a
manufacturer than merely meeting industry standards, because sci-
entific knowledge grows more rapidly than an industry can assimi-
late such knowledge. 46 Although an industry's standards may pro-
vide insight as to the past or current state of the art,47 evidence of
an industry standard may not be necessary to demonstrate what is
the state of the art.48 When the admissibility of state of the art evi-
dence is before a Maryland court, the general focus is on all of the
product-related knowledge available. 49 This broad view could en-
compass what the industry is doing currently.50 However, the appro-
priate inquiry looks not only at industry practices, but at the indus-
try's expert knowledge as well.5' Merely proving that a defendant
complied with the state of the art or industry standards will not nor-
mally exculpate the defendant from liability.52
III. THE TESTS EMPLOYED TO DETERMINE LIABILITY
One issue that must be resolved in a products liability case is
the test a court will employ to determine the contours of a given
cause of action. Maryland courts apply either the consumer expecta-
tions test or the risk-utility test to resolve various elements in each
products liability case.5 3 Neither test has been exclusively applied in
every type of products liability case in Maryland. A court's decision
cal environment, that is, what can be done." (quoting Carter v. Massey-
Ferguson, Inc., 716 F.2d 344, 347 (5th Cir. 1983))).
44. For a discussion of how Maryland courts generally define state of the art, see
supra note 21 and accompanying text.
45. See Lohrmann, 782 F.2d at 1164.
46. See id.
47. See Robb, supra note 3, at 7 (citing 2 HARPER & JAMEs, supra note 21, at 977-78
(1956)).
48. See id. at 4 n.10.
49. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
50. See PRODucTs LIABILITY PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 28, § 15.08[6] (including an
investigation of industry standards in a manufacturer's assessment of the state
of the art); cf. Reed v. Tiffin Motor Homes, Inc., 697 F.2d 1192 (4th Cir. 1982)
(applying South Carolina law) ("We find that the state of the art and trade
customs are relevant in helping the jury make a determination of whether the
product is unreasonably dangerous when used in a manner expected by the
ordinary consumer in the community.").
51. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
52. See infra note 110 and accompanying text.
53. See infra notes 54-75.
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concerning whether or not to employ the consumer expectation
test or the risk-utility test establishes the framework on which a liti-
gant can build to demonstrate the relevance of state of the art
evidence.
A. The Consumer Expectations Test
Maryland courts will frequently rely upon the consumer expec-
tations test in products liability cases. 4 The Court of Appeals of Ma-
ryland explained that the consumer expectations test requires a
court to determine whether a "product failed to perform as safely
as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended
or reasonably foreseeable manner."5  The test is objective in nature56
and is used to gauge negligence, defectiveness, unreasonable dan-
gerousness, or adequacy of warning based on the expectations of
the average consumer.5 The precise language used to frame the
consumer expectations test will vary slightly depending upon the
given context.5 8
Preliminarily, state of the art evidence may seem irrelevant
where a court chooses to apply the consumer expectations test.59
Ordinary consumers would have no expectations as to what is
known by, in many cases, only the experts in the industry.6° How-
ever, state of the art evidence may nonetheless be relevant to
demonstrate consumer expectations at the time a product was sold
54. See Kelley v. R.G. Indus., 304 Md. 124, 135-36, 497 A.2d 1143, 1148 (1985) (cit-
ing Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 344, 363 A.2d 955, 959
(1976)); Simpson v. Standard Container Co., 72 Md. App. 199, 203-04, 527
A.2d 1337, 1340 (1987); Sheehan v. Anthony Pools, 50 Md. App. 614, 621, 440
A.2d 1085, 1089-90 (1982); see also Nicholson v. Yamaha Motor Co., 80 Md.
App. 695, 717, 566 A.2d 135, 146 (1989) (citing the comments to section 402A
of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs as explaining the requirements of a strict
liability claim in terms of consumer expectations); Zeigler v. Kawasaki Heavy
Indus., 74 Md. App. 613, 620, 539 A.2d 701, 704 (1988) (noting that the con-
sumer expectations test is easier to apply where the alleged defect is a manu-
facturing error).
55. See Kelley, 304 Md. at 137, 497 A.2d at 1149 (quoting Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co.,
573 P.2d 443, 446 (Cal. 1978)).
56. See Ziegler, 74 Md. App. at 622 n.8, 539 A.2d at 705 n.8 (quoting Wade, supra
note 3, at 839-40).
57. See Kelley, 304 Md. at 135-36, 497 A.2d at 1148 (citing Phipps, 278 Md. at 344,
363 A.2d at 959).
58. See supra notes 54-57.
59. See Dewey et al., supra note 8, at 130 (noting that the consumer expectations
test deters the admissibility of state of the art evidence).
60. See infra notes 98-103.
1998]
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or manufactured. 61 Thus, when a manufacturer shows that a particu-
lar safety feature was not contemplated by even experts in a particu-
lar field, it suggests that an ordinary consumer would not expect a
particular product to embody such advanced technology.62 Overall,
the consumer expectations test appears to be losing its appeal to
Maryland courts as well as other jurisdictions. 63 While the consumer
expectations test focuses a court's attention on one factor and is rel-
atively easy to apply, it has been the subject of criticism.64 One com-
mentator has concluded that the consumer expectations test pro-
vides no guidance for reviewing courts because it justifies any result
reached by a fact-finder.65 To call on a jury to apply its amorphous
dictates provides the jury with little meaningful instruction.66 The
Restatement (Third) of the Law of Torts: Products Liability indicates that
the consumer expectations test's days are numbered.67 The new Re-
61. See I MADDEN, supra note 36, § 12.13, at 530 (discussing Bruce v. Martin-
Marietta Corp., 544 F.2d 442 (10th Cir. 1976)).
62. See Wade, supra note 3, at 829 ("[I] n many situations, particularly involving de-
sign matters, the consumer would not know what to expect, because he would
have no idea how safe the product could be made.").
63. See infra notes 216-17 and accompanying text.
64. One commentator has highlighted three recurring criticisms of the consumer
expectations test:
First, the test caused confusion about whose expectations should con-
trol in cases in which the expectations of an injured child, patient,
employee or bystander who used the product differed significantly
from the expectations of the parent, doctor, employer or owner who
purchased or prescribed the product. Second, the test seemed inade-
quate in complex product cases in which the consumer simply did
not have any well-defined expectations about product safety in vari-
ous accident scenarios. Third, the consumer expectation test did not
permit liability in obvious danger cases.
Westerbeke, supra note 9, at 9.
65. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 99, at
699 (5th ed. 1984).
66. See id.
67. In commenting on the REsTATEMENT (THIRD), James Henderson, Jr., one of its
reporters noted:
If you look at the scholarship prior to 1992-I'm thinking of giants
like Prosser, Wade, Page Keeton and some contemporaries who are
in this room; Gary Schwartz, Stu Madden. These are major players in
this products liability field almost without exception they, in their
earlier work, said consumer expectations will not work as a main-
stream test. It's got to be some form of risk-utility.
James A. Henderson, Jr., Symposium, A Discussion and Defense of the Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 8 KAN. J.L. & PuB. POL'v. 19, 20 (1998).
[Vol. 28
State of the Art Evidence in Products Liability
statement merges the consumer expectations test with the risk-utility
test.6s Instead of forming the entire inquiry, the consumer expecta-
tion becomes merely one of several factors a court considers in ana-
lyzing a manufacturer's conduct or product under the Restatement
(Third) of Torts. 69
B. The Risk-Utility Test
Alternatively, Maryland courts will assess a manufacturer's liabil-
ity pursuant to the risk-utility test.70 The risk-utility test, under which
state of the art evidence is more readily admissible, 7' requires that
the trier of fact weigh the "utility of risk inherent in the [product]
against the magnitude of the risk."72 The plaintiff has the burden of
proving that the utility or benefit that the defendant's product pro-
vides society is outweighed by the probability and severity of risk to
the consumer.7 3 The risk-utility analysis takes into consideration a
number of factors including: the availability of alternative products
that meet the needs of the consumer, but are safer; the manufac-
turer's ability to eliminate the danger of the product without im-
pairing its utility; and the common knowledge that users have about
the dangerousness of the product.74 A litigant seeking to admit state
68. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODuCTS LL Iu1y § 2 cmts. a, g, m (ex-
plaining that in design defect and inadequate warning cases, a risk-utility bal-
ancing test should be applied that weighs consumer expectations as one of its
factors).
69. See Henderson, supra note 67, at 26 ("[tlhe consumer expectation test . .. is
not a stand alone test for defect. But it is a factor, and an important factor, in
risk-utility balancing.").
70. See Kelley v. R.G. Indus., 304 Md. 124, 136, 497 A.2d 1143, 1148-49 (1985) (cit-
ing Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978)).
71. See DEWEY ET AL, supra note 8, at 130.
72. Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 345, 363 A.2d 955, 959 (1976);
accord KEETON ET AL, supra note 65, § 99, at 699.
73. See Kelley, 304 Md. at 137, 497 A.2d at 1149 (citing Barker, 573 P.2d at 446);
Troja v. Black & Decker Mfg., 62 Md. App. 101, 108-09, 488 A.2d 516, 519
(1985); see also infra notes 123-27 and accompanying text.
74. SeeJohn W. Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. LJ. 5, 17 (1965).
Eight years after initially establishing these factors, Dean John W. Wade re-
vised them to include:
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product-its utility to the
user and to the public as a whole (2) The safety aspects of the prod-
uct-the likelihood it will cause injury, and the probable seriousness
of the injury (3) The availability of a substitute product which would
meet the same need and not be as unsafe (4) The manufacturer's
ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product without im-
pairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain its util-
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of the art evidence will often establish that it is relevant to one of
the several factors that form the risk-utility test.75
C. Plaintiffs Theory of Recovery
When a court must decide whether to admit state of the art evi-
dence, its approach varies markedly depending on whether the ac-
tion lies in negligence, strict liability, or both.7 6 Within the negli-
gence and strict liability arena, a court's approach to the
admissibility of state of the art evidence will differ depending on
whether the claim is one for manufacturing defect,77 design defect,78
or failure to warn. 79 Careful analysis of each cause of action demon-
strates the role of state of the art evidence in products liability law.
IV. NEGLIGENCE
The primary distinction between a products liability suit
grounded in negligence and one in strict liability is that negligence
suits focus on the conduct of the manufacturer, whereas suits
brought in strict liability focus on the product itself.80 Before any
ity (5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in
the use of the product (6) The user's anticipated awareness of the
dangers inherent in the product and their avoidability, because of
general public knowledge of the obvious condition of the product, or
of the existence of suitable warnings or instructions (7) The feasibil-
ity, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the loss by-setting
the price of the product or carrying liability insurance.
Wade, supra note 3, at 837-38; accord Valk Mfg. v. Rangaswamy, 74 Md. App.
304, 314, 537 A.2d 622, 627 (1988), rev'd on other grounds, 317 Md. 185, 562
A.2d 1246 (1989); Sheehan v. Anthony Pools, 50 Md. App. 614, 620 n.6, 440
A.2d 1085, 1089 n.6 (1982).
75. See infra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
76. See Robb, supra note 3, at 3 (asserting that the application of state of the art
evidence depends on the theory of liability advanced); Reynolds & Sunahara,
supra note 18, at 184 (explaining that the definitions of state of the art de-
pends on the court's context).
77. See infra notes 90-96 and accompanying text.
78. See infra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
79. See infra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
80. See Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 344, 363 A.2d 955, 958
(1976); KEETON ET AL, supra note 65, § 99, at 365 ("In strict liability, the plain-
tiff is not required to impugn the conduct of the maker or other seller, but
he is required to impugn the product."); 2 LEE & LINDAHiL supra note 40, §
27.77, at 734-35; 1 MADDEN, supra note 36, § 12.13, at 531 (quoting Cryts v.
Ford Motor Co., 571 S.W.2d 683, 689 (Mo. App. 1978)). But cf Denny v. Ford
Motor Co., 662 N.E.2d 730, 735 (N.Y. 1995) (quoting S. Birnbaum, Unmasking
the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negli-
gence, 33 VAND. L. REv. 593, 610, 648 (1980) (noting in a design defect case
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Maryland court squarely addressed whether state of the art evidence
was admissible in any type of product liability case, one commenta-
tor noted: "There is little doubt that state of the art evidence is ad-
missible in negligence cases because negligence focuses on a manu-
facturer's conduct and compares that conduct to what a reasonable
manufacturer in similar circumstances would have done."8' These
comments are in accord with the near unanimous view state courts
have adopted.82 One important reason for admitting state of the art
evidence in a negligence case is that it would be unreasonable to
hold a manufacturer liable for its failure to employ technology or
warn of dangers that were not invented or known at the time of
manufacture. 3 However, a manufacturer does not have to imple-
ment state of the art technology to avoid liability.84 If one begins
from the premise that state of the art evidence is likely to be admit-
ted in all negligence cases,8 5 one naturally might question why any
further discussion is necessary. First, even though state of the art ev-
idence may, on a general level, be admissible in negligence suits,
the evidence must be relevant.8 6 Accordingly, a litigant must convey
brought in strict liability that "the reality is that the risk/utility balancing test
is a 'negligence inspired' approach, since it invites the parties to adduce proof
about the manufacturer's choices and ultimately requires the factfinder to
make a 'judgment about [the manufacture's] judgement')).
81. Digges & Bilmyre, supra note 8, at 52 n.302.
82. See 1 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, § 8.04[6], at 8-204 (explaining that a
defendant's use of state of the art evidence in a negligence matter nearly con-
stitutes a complete defense and concluding that the plaintiff "cannot recover,
absent proving that the defendant is mistaken").
83. See 3 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, § 18.03[4], at 18-56. This treatise goes
on to note that "it is just as unreasonable and illogical in a strict liability cause
of action, but for policy reasons, a number of courts ha[ve] chosen to ignore
logic and reason." Id. at 18, n.45.
84. See id. at 18-58.
85. See 3 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, § 18.03[3], at 18-56 ("Evidence of the
state of the art is almost universally admitted with respect to negligence causes
of action."); DEWEY ET AL, supra note 8, at 130 ("In negligence suits, such evi-
dence is typically admitted to demonstrate the reasonableness of the defend-
ant's conduct."); Robert F. Blomquist, Emerging Themes and Dilemmas in Ameri-
can Toxic Tort Law, 1988-91: A Legal-Historical and Philosophical Exegesis, 18 S.
ILL U.L.J. 1, 30 n.74 (1993) (noting that state of the art evidence is relevant
to foreseeability); Robb, supra note 3, at 6 (noting that for negligence claims,
courts "uniformly admit state of the art evidence"); Vargo, supra note 4, at
628.
86. See MD. R. EvID. 5-401 (defining relevance); MD. R. EvID. 5-402 (addressing ad-
missibility of relevant evidence); accord FED. R. Evm. 401 (defining relevance);
FED. R. EVD. 402 (addressing admissibility of relevant evidence). On the admis-
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to the court the elements of the cause of action to which state of
the art evidence is relevant. Second, there are certain strategic rea-
sons why a plaintiff may want to include a negligence claim with
one in strict liability.87 A party's use of state of the art evidence in a
negligence case is one item to be considered.88 Finally, most courts
are in agreement with the Restatement (Third) of Products Liability inas-
much as they do not apply strict liability to most design defect and
inadequate warning claims. 89
A. Manufacturing Defect
Of the millions of products that come off assembly lines across
the nation, there exists an irreducible minimum number of prod-
ucts that will contain manufacturing defects.9° These manufacturing
defects often cause injuries even when the product is used as in-
sibility of relevant evidence, the Court of Appeals of Maryland has observed:
There are two components to relevant evidence: materiality and pro-
bative value. Materiality looks to the relation between the proposi-
tions for which the evidence is offered and the issues of the case. If
the evidence is offered to help prove a proposition which is not a
matter in issue, the evidence is immaterial. What is in issue, that is,
within the range of litigated controversy, is determined mainly by the
pleadings, read in the light of the rules of pleading and controlled
by the substantive law.
Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc., 303 Md. 581, 600, 495 A.2d 348, 358 (1985)
(quoting E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 185, at 541 (3d ed. 1984)).
87. See infra notes 188-89 and accompanying text.
88. See infra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
89. See Westerbeke, supra note 9, at 6-8. As one commentator observed:
Strict liability occurs when a manufacturer is held liable for failing to
warn about an unknowable danger .... Strict liability occurs when a
manufacturer is held liable for failing to adopt a design that was not
technologically feasible at the time of manufacture and sale ....
The majority of courts have not applied true strict liability to either
warning or design defect cases .... By adopting a negligence stan-
dard for design defect and warning defects, the new Restatement shifts
away from a rigid "strict liability" view of section 402A and more to-
ward the "products liability" view.
Id.
90. See RESrATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTs § 2 cmt. a (1997) (noting that manufactur-
ers know "that a predictable number of flawed products will enter the market-
place" and consciously deliberate "about the amount of injury that will result
from their activity"); Westerbeke, supra note 9, at 6 ("Theoretically, an occa-
sional flaw in a unit of production will occur despite the most carefully devel-
oped system of production and will avoid discovery despite the most carefully
planned and implemented system of testing and inspection.").
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tended.91 A finished product that qualitatively varies from the nor-
mal production run by being defective due to poor material selec-
tion,92 defective assembly,93 or improper testing and inspection" can
result in liability to the manufacturer.95 To determine whether a
manufacturer will be held liable for a manufacturing defect in a
negligence suit, courts will focus on the manufacturer's conduct
during these various stages of manufacturing.96
91. See Coca Cola Bottling Works v. Catron, 186 Md. 156, 160-61, 46 A.2d 303, 305
(1946) (noting that a plaintiff who drank a bottle of soda and suffered from
vomiting and nausea after discovering a mouse in the bottle and permitting
the jury to infer that the soda caused the illness).
92. See Babylon v. Scruton, 215 Md. 299, 306, 138 A.2d 375, 379 (1958) ("[Tlhe
jury could properly infer that four short [reinforcing rods], two on each side,
did not make the [concrete] slab reasonably safe for its intended use.").
93. See id. at 307, 138 A-2d at 379 ("Babylon proved that the concrete in the bro-
ken slab was sound and of structural quality .... [The break] had to be due
to the inadequate reinforcement."); see also Harley-Davidson Motor Co. v. Wis-
nieski, 50 Md. App. 339, 346, 437 A.2d 700, 704 (1981). In Wisnieski, a motor-
cycle rider sued a motorcycle manufacturer for personal injuries sustained
when the throttle assembly slipped off the handlebars. See id. at 343, 437 A2d
at 702. In discussing the plaintiff's negligent manufacturing defect claim, the
court noted that "[i]t was obvious from the testimony that [Harley-Davidson]
had used less than an ideal assembly process." Id. at 346, 437 A.2d at 704.
94. See Coca Cola Bottling Works, 186 Md. at 160, 46 A.2d at 305 (noting that the
presence of a mouse in a bottle of soda when opened is sufficient evidence to
infer that the manufacturer was negligent in either processing or inspecting
the product); 2 JAMES A. DOOLE. MODERN TORT LITIGATION § 32.13 & n.2
(1977) ("Industry frequently employs spot or check testing .. [ (which] may
be inadequate." (citing Trowbridge v. Abrasive Co. of Phila., 190 F2d 825 (3d
Cir. 1951))).
95. See Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 50 Md. App. at 346, 437 A.2d at 704 (affirming
the jury verdict for compensatory damages as "[t]here was more than suffi-
cient evidence to establish negligence on the part of Harley-Davidson"); see
also KEETON ET AL., supra note 65, § 96, at 699 ("A manufacturer who fails to
exercise reasonable care to avoid and discover unintended dangers occurring
in the construction process is subject to liability.").
96. See Doe v. Miles Lab., Inc., 927 F.2d 187, 193 (4th Cir. 1991) ("In the manufac-
ture and distribution of blood and blood products, [the defendant] is held to
the standard of care, skill, and diligence that a reasonable pharmaceutical
manufacturer would use under the same or similar circumstances."); Babylon,
215 Md. at 303, 138 A.2d at 377 ("Reasonable care in manufacture includes
the adoption and use of a plan ... which, if properly followed, will produce
an article safe for the use for which it is produced, the selection and use of
proper materials and parts, and the making of such tests during manufacture
and after the article is completed" to ensure safety); Salisbury Coca Cola Bot-
tling Co. v. Lowe, 176 Md. 230, 238, 241, 4 A.2d 440, 444, 446 (1939) (noting
that evidence of the efficiency and design of the defendant's manufacturing
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A cause of action for negligent manufacturing accrues when a
manufacturer fails to exercise reasonable care and creates a defec-
tive product that causes harm to the user.97 Maryland courts have ar-
ticulated a heightened duty of care for manufacturers, noting that
they "will be held to the skill of an expert in th[eir] business and to
an expert's knowledge of the arts, materials, and processes."98 The
steps that a manufacturer must take to avoid liability varies with the
degree of potential harm the product may cause to its user.99 When
equipment and system of inspection was relevant to the issue of due care); see
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 395 cmt. f (1965). Comment f states:
The particulars in which reasonable care is usually necessary for pro-
tection for those whose safety depends upon the character of chattels
are, (1) the adoption of a formula or plan which, if properly fol-
lowed, will produce an article safe for the use for which it is sold, (2)
the selection of material and parts to be incorporated in the finished
article, (3) the fabrication of the article by every member of the op-
erative staff no matter how high or low his position therein, (4) mak-
ing such inspections and tests during the course of manufacture and
after the article is completed as the manufacturer should recognize
as reasonably necessary to secure the production of a safe article, and
(5) the packing of the article so as to be safe for those who must be
expected to unpack it.
Id
97. See Woolley v. Uebelhor, 239 Md. 318, 325, 211 A.2d 302, 305-06 (1965) (noting
that a mere assertion that a product fails to perform as expected was not suffi-
cient evidence to allow the issue of negligent manufacture to be submitted to
the jury); Babylon, 215 Md. at 303, 138 A.2d at 377. The Babylon court observed
that Maryland courts adhere to the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 395 cmt. c
(1934) and impose liability on manufacturers who fail "to exercise reasonable
care in manufacturing any article which, if carelessly manufactured, is likely to
cause more than trivial harm to those who use it." Babylon, 215 Md. at 303,
138 A.2d at 377.
98. Babylon, 215 Md. at 304, 138 A.2d at 377 (quoting 2 HARPER & JAMES, supra
note 21, § 28.4). In addition, the manufacturer "must keep reasonably abreast
of scientific knowledge and discoveries touching his [products] and of tech-
niques and devices used by practical men in his trade." Id; see also 2 DOOLEY,
supra note 94, § 32.10 (providing that a manufacturer should be held to the
standards of an expert and charged with superior knowledge).
99. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 395 cmt. e (1965) ("[T]he character of
harm likely to result from the failure to exercise care in manufacture affects
the question as to what is reasonable care."). Furthermore, comment e states
in part that:
It is reasonable to require those who make or assemble automobiles
to subject the raw material, or parts, procured from even reputable
manufacturers, to inspections and tests which it would be obviously
unreasonable to require of a product which, although defective, is
unlikely to cause more than some comparatively slight, though still
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a product, such as an automobile, poses great risk to the consumer
if defective, courts will require "the manufacturer to exercise almost
meticulous precautions in order to secure substantial
perfection. " l°°
The burden is on the plaintiff in a negligent manufacturing
case to demonstrate that the manufacturer deviated in some man-
ner from the required degree of care to ensure product safety.'0'
While consumer expectations may guide a court's inquiry, in certain
contexts, Maryland courts appear willing to apply the risk-utility test
in assessing whether a manufacturer violated its duty of care. 02 In
substantial, harm to those who use it. Manufacturers owe this reason-
able care duty not only to the direct purchasers of the product, but
also to "all persons whose right or privilege to use the article is de-
rived from" the purchaser.'
IL
100. Id. at § 395 cmt. g.
101. See Woolley, 239 Md. at 325, A.2d at 305-06 (upholding a directed verdict in
favor of a manufacturer because plaintiff failed to produce evidence, beyond
mere possibility or speculation, that the manufacturer failed to exercise rea-
sonable care in manufacturing an automobile); Salisbury Coca Cola Bottling Co.,
176 Md. at 244, 4 A.2d at 447 (approving a trial court's instruction to the jury
that the plaintiff has the burden to prove that the defendant failed to exercise
reasonable care in manufacturing its product); Vito v. Sargis &Jones, 108 Md.
App. 408, 417 A.2d 129, 134 (1996) ("In a negligence action, plaintiff, of
course, has the burden of proving defendant's negligence." (citing Harris v.
Otis Elevator Co., 92 Md. App. 49, 51, 606 A.2d 305, 306-07 (1992))).
102. In Babylon, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision to submit
the case to the jury. See Babylon, 215 Md. at 305, 138 A.2d at 378. The Babylon
court explained that the case could have been submitted to the jury under a
theory of design defect and in the alternative, manufacturing defect. See id. at
303-05, 138 A-2d at 377-78. The court employed the risk-utility language to de-
termine whether the product was defective, but it is unclear whether the court
was limiting its analysis to the design defect claim and not the manufacturing
defect claim. See id. at 304, 138 A.2d at 378. For other cases applying the risk-
utility test to determine a manufacturer's negligence, see Doe v. Miles Lab.,
Inc., 927 F2d 187, 194 (4th Cir. 1991) (applying a risk - utility analysis to a
negligent manufacturing claim brought against a pharmaceutical manufac-
turer, under Maryland law, for failing to properly test its product for contami-
nation); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 395 (1965). Comment (d)
provides that success in an action for negligent manufacture requires "that
the risk [created by the negligently manufactured product] be an unreasona-
ble [risk], as stated in § 291." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRs § 395 cmt. d
(1965). Section 291 states that a risk is unreasonable if it "outweigh[s] what
the law regards [to be] the utility of the act" which created the risk. RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 291 (1965); see also Moran v. Faberg6, 273 Md. 538,
543, 332 A.2d 11, 15 (1975) (stating that an unreasonable risk exists if the seri-
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order to demonstrate the relevance of state of the art evidence, not
only should a party tie its evidence in with factors relevant to due
care in general, but also to specific factors in the risk-utility test. 03
A plaintiff could use state of the art evidence to demonstrate
the feasibility of adopting alternative manufacturing techniques that
would decrease the likelihood of products being manufactured in
an unsafe manner.1°4 When a defendant fails to adopt state of the
art manufacturing techniques, the defendant should argue that the
increased risks imposed on the consumer by its manufacturing pro-
cess were outweighed by the decreased utility of implementing the
proposed manufacturing process. 105 If the allegation relates to negli-
gent product testing, a manufacturer can provide convincing rebut-
tal evidence by demonstrating that it complied with industry stan-
dards or lacked the capability to know of the suggested technique
for testing its product.106
Alternatively, the defendant manufacturer can use state of the
art evidence to show that it acted with reasonable care in manufac-
ousness of harm outweighs the cost of taking appropriate precautions).
103. See infra notes 104-10 and accompanying text.
104. See Wade, supra note 3, at 838. The fourth Wade factor requires the court to
look to "[t]he manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the
product without impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to main-
tain its utility." I.; cf. ACandS, Inc. v. Abate, 121 Md. App. 590, 699-702, 710
A.2d 944, 998-99 (1996) (approving a jury instruction by the trial court that
explained that "[t]he manufacturer has a duty to test and inspect its products
commensurate with the dangers that the manufacturer knows or should know
are involved.") Neither Maryland appellate courts nor federal courts interpret-
ing Maryland law have dealt with the admissibility of state of the art evidence
in a negligent manufacturing defect case. See DEWEY ET AL., supra note 8, at
131. It has been recognized that "[t]he relevance of the level of technology at
the time the product was made ... would seem to be of little value in estab-
lishing that the manufacturer failed to meet its own production standards." Id.
However, it may be relevant to demonstrate other elements of a manufactur-
ing defect claim in negligence. See infra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
105. Cf. Doe, 927 F.2d at 194. The Doe court noted that the only alternative the
manufacturer had to avoid the risks of manufacturing defects in its products
was to withdraw the product. See id. The court held that "[s]uch a measure
would be too drastic in light of the disparity between the slight risk of trans-
mitting AIDS during the use of [the product] and the life essential features of
the product." Id.
106. See id. at 193-94 ("Hindsight opinions by [plaintiff's] experts suggesting that
more should have been done to prevent the transmission of what was then
and now remains an enigmatic disease are insufficient to discredit the conclu-
sion that the applicable standard of care did not require [the defendant] to
utilize screening and testing procedures at the time of [plaintiff's] injury.").
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turing its product. °7 A defendant could accomplish this by offering
proof that the manufacturing techniques employed were state of
the art. °8 Generally, compliance with state of the art, as with com-
pliance with industry standards, does not provide an absolute de-
fenseY°9 In Maryland, compliance with state of the art is likely to be
weighed as one factor in assessing the manufacturer's exercise of
reasonable care." 0 While litigants continue to combine negligent
manufacturing claims with strict liability claims, fewer negligent
manufacturing claims are brought due to difficulties of meeting the
burden of proof."' The difficulty in proving a manufacturing defect
claim often rests with establishing the origin of the defect."2 The
107. Cf. Salisbury Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Lowe, 176 Md. 230, 241, 4 A.2d 440,
446 (1939) (noting that the defendant put forth evidence of its "modern"
manufacturing process to establish that it exercised reasonable care).
108. See, e.g., Dreiling v. General Elec. Co., 511 F.2d 768, 775 (5th Cir. 1975) ("On
the negligence issue, [the defendant] introduced substantial testimony regard-
ing the care with which it manufactured its heart pacemakers. [The defend-
ant's] evidence was to the effect that its production methods represented the
most advanced procedure possible under the current state of the art.").
109. See 3 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, § 18.03[4] & n.53 (quoting The T.J.
Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932); Gelsumino v. E.W. Bliss Co., 296 N.E.2d
110, 113 (Ill. App. 1973)).
110. Cf. Salisbuty Coca Cola Bottling Co., 176 Md. at 238, 241, 244, 4 A.2d at 444, 446-
47 (1939) (noting that the defendant's testimony regarding its modem manu-
facturing and inspection system that was designed to remove any semblance of
the contamination complained of in the plaintiff's complaint was a factor to
be considered by the jury in assessing whether the defendant was negligent in
manufacturing its product).
111. See Woolley v. Uelbelhor, 239 Md. 318, 325, 211 A.2d 302, 305 (1965) (uphold-
ing a directed verdict in favor of automobile manufacturer) (citing RSrATE.-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 395 (1965)). The Woolley court noted that "[tihere
was no testimony rising above possibility or speculation that at the time
Chrysler sent the car from its plant... it was dangerous .... Id. See generally
Robert E. Powell & M. King Hill, Jr., Proof of a Defect or Defectiveness, 5 U. BALT.
L REv. 77, 90 (1976) ("[Wihen the product is more complex . . . proving a
defect will be more difficult.").
112. See Hacker v. Shofer, 251 Md. 672, 677, 248 A.2d 351, 354 (1968) ("There was
no evidence before the Court as to the origin of the defect in the bicycle. We
cannot presume as to its origin."). A plaintiff cannot simply rely on the doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur, unless the item remains under the control of the
defendant at the time of the injury. See id. at 676, 248 A.2d at 353; Harrison v.
Bill Cairns Pontiac of Marlow Heights, Inc., 77 Md. App. 41, 48, 549 A.2d 385,
389 (1988). In a case that involved an alleged manufacturing defect in a bicy-
cle, the court of appeals explained: "[TIhis is not a situation where res ipsa lo-
quitur may apply where you can merely say 'we had this article; we were using
it and we were injured,' and offer no explanation of how the injury occurred
1998]
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plaintiff's burden of presenting evidence that demonstrates the spe-
cific act or omission by a manufacturer that resulted in the plain-
tiff's injury is nearly impossible." 3
Nevertheless, the desire to put evidence of a lack of due care
before the jury through state of the art evidence may influence a
plaintiff's choice to claim negligence in conjunction with a claim in
strict liability."14 Unlike inadequate warning and design defect
claims, manufacturing defect claims appear to maintain distinctions
when brought under a strict liability theory, as opposed to negli-
gence. 15 While negligent design cases parallel negligent manufac-
turing cases, separate consideration for each cause of action is
warranted.
B. Design Defect
Prior to manufacturing a product, manufacturers make crucial
decisions about the design of their products." 6 These decisions af-
fect the safety of the end product. 17 The crucial distinction between
with reference to the construction of the article." Hacker, 251 Md. at 676, 248
A.2d at 353; see also KEETON ET AL, supra note 65, § 99, at 695 (detailing sev-
eral reasons why res ipsa loquitur is rarely successful in manufacturing defect
cases).
113. See KEETON ET AL, supra note 65, § 99, at 695; Wade, supra note 3, at 825-26.
114. See Digges & Billmyre, supra note 8, at 23. As one commentator recognized:
There are certain tactical advantages to including a negligence claim
in a product liability action. A strict product liability claim focuses on
the allegedly defective product, but a negligence claim focuses on
the product and any culpable conduct of the defendant. Directing at-
tention to the defendant's alleged carelessness not only generates
sympathy among jurors, but also increases the likelihood of a puni-
tive damages award.
Id. It would seem to naturally follow that when a manufacturer has imple-
mented state of the art technology in its product, a claimant would want to
avoid bringing a suit in negligence if a court, considering only a claim in
strict liability, would not admit such evidence.
115. See infra notes 218-39 and accompanying text; see also Westerbeke, supra note 9,
at 6-7 (noting that the majority of courts have not applied true strict liability
to warning or design defect cases, but have found it appropriate for manufac-
turing defect cases).
116. See, e.g., Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 274 Md. 288, 291-92, 336 A.2d 118,
121 (1975) (alleging that the defendant was negligent in design by "using
steel alloys of inadequate tensile strength in construction of roof supports
[and] by using steel alloys of insufficient strength and thickness in seat tilting
mechanism").
117. See i& see also Ziegler v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., 74 Md. App. 613, 623, 539 A.2d
701, 706 (1988) ("The most important aspect of the design defect is that it is
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a design defect and a manufacturing defect is that products that are
defectively designed come off the assembly line as intended,
whereas a manufacturing defect occurs when a product deviates
from the intended design." 8
Often a plaintiff asserts, with the benefit of hindsight, that the
design chosen was unreasonable," 9 thereby rendering the product
the result of a conscious and voluntary choice of the form of quality of the
product. The result of such a defect is that the plaintiff is injured while using
the product in its ordinary and intended manner.'" (quoting Comment, Fore-
seeability in Product Design and Duty to Warn Cases-Distinctions and Misconceptions,
1 Wis. L. REV. 228, 231 (1968))).
118. See Frank J. Vandall, The Restatement (Third) of Torts, Products Liability, Section
2(B): Design Defect, 68 TEMP. L. REv. 167, 177 (1995) Angela C. Rushton, Com-
ment, Design Defect under the Restatement (Third) of Torts: A Reassessment of Strict
Liability and the Goals of a Functional Approach, 45 EMORY LJ. 389, 396 (1996)
("According to the traditional definition, a manufacturing defect occurs when
a product does not conform to the manufacturer's design as a result of a mis-
take in the manufacturing process. A design defect, on the other hand, occurs
when the product is produced as the manufacturer intended, but, because of
some aspect of the design, the product is unreasonably dangerous."); see also
KEEToN ET AL, supra note 65, § 96, at 685 ("A manufacturer or other seller in
the marketing chain is subject to liability for negligence in selling a product
with a flaw in the product. A flaw in a product is a condition of the product
that is different than what was intended to be.").
119. See Pontififex v. Sears, Roebuck, & Co., 226 F.2d 909, 909-10 (4th Cir. 1955)
(holding that a lawn mower's design was not defective simply because newer
models incorporated an additional safety feature); Rock v. Oster Corp., 810 F.
Supp. 665, 667 (D. Md. 1991) (holding that the plaintiffs' lack of care in
preventing the spilling of a fondue pot of hot oil defeated their alternative de-
sign arguments); Polansky v. Ryobi Am. Corp., 760 F. Supp. 85, 87-88 (D. Md.
1991) (holding that the probative value of an alternative design outweighed
the risk of unfair prejudice in determining the relevance of evidence); Single-
ton v. International Harvester Co., 727 F.2d 217, 223 (D. Md. 1989) (holding
that there was no duty on a crane manufacturer to eliminate all blind spots);
Mondshour v. General Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 111, 114 (D. Md. 1969)
(holding that a bus was not defectively designed because the manufacturer im-
plemented a reasonably safe design for the time of manufacture); Volkswagen
of America, Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 216, 321 A.2d 737, 745 (1974) (hold-
ing that a plaintiff may recover for enhanced injuries sustained due to a auto-
mobile manufacturer's negligent design, notwithstanding the negligence of
the plaintiff or the driver in resulting in the accident); Myers v. Montgomery
Ward & Co., 253 Md. 282, 295, 252 A.2d 855, 863 (1969) (holding that a lawn
mower manufacturer was not required to utilize state of the art designs to es-
cape liability); Babylon v. Scruton, 215 Md. 299, 138 A.2d 375 (1958) (holding
that the jury could properly infer that the design of a concrete roofing slab by
the manufacturer was not reasonably safe for its intended use); Nicholson v.
Yamaha Motor Co., 80 Md. App. 695, 712, 566 A.2d 135, 144 (1989) (holding
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defective and the manufacturer liable under a negligent design the-
ory. °20 However, Maryland courts will not find a manufacturer liable
for negligent design solely because the plaintiff's injury occurred. 2'
To recover under this theory, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the
manufacturer could have reasonably foreseen that the design would
cause injuries, was not obvious to the user, and that the design actu-
ally caused the injuries alleged. 122
In determining whether a manufacturer negligently designed
its product, 23 courts focus on whether the manufacturer exercised
reasonable care at the time of manufacture. 24 Not only must the
that a manufacturer had no duty to include a motorcycle safety device); Simp-
son v. Standard Container Co., 72 Md. App. 199, 207, 527 A.2d 1337, 1341
(1987) (affirming the trial court's dismissal of a case concerning an allegedly
defectively designed gasoline can because of the obviousness of the danger);
Banks v. Iron Hustler Corp., 59 Md. App. 408, 425, 475 A.2d 1243, 1251 (1984)
(holding that the plaintiff created an issue of fact by disputing the patency of
an alleged design defect); Jensen v. American Motors Corp., 50 Md. App. 226,
235, 437 A.2d 242, 247 (1981) (holding that the plaintiffs failed to meet the
burden of proof by not demonstrating what probably happened); American
Laundry Mach. Indus. v. Horan, 45 Md. App. 97, 106-07, 412 A.2d 407, 414-15
(1980) (holding that the defendants' failure to implement a safety device it
patented supported the jury's verdict for the plaintiffs).
120. See, e.g., Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822, 825 (7th Cir. 1966)
(claiming that a manufacturer created. "an unreasonable risk of serious injury"
by its choice in design); Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 353,
363 A.2d 955, 963 (1976) (adopting section 402A of THE RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND)); Ziegler, 74 Md. App. at 623-24, 539 A.2d at 706.
121. SeeJensen, 50 Md. App. at 230-32, 437 A.2d at 245.
122. See Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 272 Md. at 216, 321 A.2d at 745; see also Rock, 810 F
Supp. at 667 (holding that the danger posed by a fondue pot's cord was obvi-
ous); Nicholson, 80 Md. App. at 715, 566 A.2d at 145 (concluding that the dan-
gers of a motorcycle without safety devices are obvious); see also note 119 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the latent/patent rule in strict liability
design defect cases. The requirement that the danger be latent has drawn
great criticism. See Banks, 59 Md. App. at 422-23, 475 A.2d at 1250 (characteriz-
ing the latent/patent rule as an "anachronism" that should be discarded).
123. Unlike negligent manufacture, where the courts look to a negligent deviation
from the manufacturer's design, plaintiffs pursuing claims under negligent de-
sign defect seek to demonstrate the negligence resulted in the design itself.
See Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 272 Md. at 207, 321 A.2d at 740.
124. See Mondshour, 298 F Supp. at 114 (observing that the manufacturer's negli-
gence must be measured at the time of manufacture, not that of the trial); cf.
Singleton v. Manitowoc, 727 F. Supp. 217, 223-24 (1989) (finding no defect in
a crane based on the manufacturer's duty when the product was originally
sold); Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 272 Md. at 216, 321 A.2d at 745 ("In sum, 'tradi-
tional rules of negligence' lead to the conclusion that [a] ... manufacturer is
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manufacturer design the product to satisfy foreseeable uses, but it
has an affirmative duty to test a product for design defects.12 5 To de-
termine where reasonable care was exercised, Maryland courts apply
the risk-utility test under which the likelihood and the gravity of the
harm are weighed against the burden of implementing the precau-
tions necessary to avoid that harm.1 26 Specifically, the risk-utility test
is used to measure when a defect exists to the extent that reasona-
ble care would require that the manufacturer produce a safer
product.27
Often in a negligent design case, a plaintiff must demonstrate
the manufacturer's negligence through expert testimony.1 28 This ex-
pert testimony may amount to state of the art evidence.12 9 The
Court of Appeals of Maryland indicated the relevance of state of the
art evidence in Babylon v. Scruton.13° In Babylon, the court of appeals
addressed a negligence claim regarding a manufacturer's allegedly
defective design of a concrete roofing slab.' 3' In so doing, the court
noted:
liable for a defect in design which the manufacturer could have reasonably
foreseen would cause or enhance injuries .... which is not patent or obvious
to the user, and which in fact leads to or enhances ... injuries.").
125. See Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 274 Md. 288, 302, 336 A.2d 118, 126-27
(1975) (holding that the manufacturer's alleged failure to test its product
helped establish the plaintiff's statement of a claim for which relief could be
granted); Nicholson v. Yamaha Motor Co., 80 Md. App. 695, 712, 566 A.2d
135, 144 (1989) (addressing whether a plaintiff may recover for a design de-
fect for a manufacturer's failure to test other available safety options).
126. See Rock, 810 F. Supp. at 666; Phipps, 278 Md. at 345-46, 363 A.2d at 959; Volk-
swagen of Md., Inc., 272 Md. at 213, 321 A.2d at 743; Nicholson, 80 Md. App. at
712-13, 566 A.2d at 144. For example, when discussing the style and intended
purpose for the vehicle, one court noted that a "convertible could not be
made 'as safe in roll-over accidents as a standard four-door sedan with center
posts and full-door frames."' Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwek, A. G., 489 F.2d
1066, 1072 (4th Cir. 1974) (quoting Dyson v. General Motors Corp., 298 F
Supp. 1064, 1073 (D.C. Pa. 1979)).
127. See Babylon v. Scruton, 215 Md. 299, 304, 138 A.2d 375, 378 (1958).
128. See Digges & Billmyre, supra note 8, at 27; cf. Howard v. McCrory, 601 F.2d
133, 138 (4th Cir. 1979) (admitting expert testimony regarding an alternative
test for flammability of a child's pajamas).
129. See, e.g., Doe v. Miles Lab., Inc., 927 F.2d 187, 193-94 (4th Cir. 1991) (noting
that the expert testimony proffered by the plaintiff failed to establish a state
of the art sufficient to place a duty to screen and test for AIDS on the defend-
ant).
130. 215 Md. 299, 138 A.2d 375 (1958).
131. See id. at 305-06, 138 A.2d at 379.
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[A] person who undertakes such manufacturing will be
held to the skill of an expert in that business and to an ex-
pert's knowledge of the arts, materials, and processes. Thus
[a manufacturer] must keep reasonably abreast of scientific
knowledge and discoveries touching his produce and of
techniques and devices used by practical men in his
trade. 132
While this language highlights the relevance of state of the art evi-
dence, the words "techniques and devices used by the practical men
in the trade" led future courts to focus more attention on the com-
pliance with industry standards to assess a manufacturer's exercise
of due care. 33
State of the art evidence is useful in establishing the reasona-
bleness of a manufacturer's conduct in designing a product.134 A
plaintiff might use it to demonstrate a reasonably safe alternative to
the defendant's design. 35 Indeed, some courts may require a plain-
tiff to provide evidence that a reasonable alternative design ex-
132. Id. at 304, 138 A.2d at 378 (quoting 2 HARPER &JAMES, supra note 21, § 28.4).
133. Moran v. Faberg6, Inc., 273 Md. 538, 552 n.10, 332 A.2d 11, 20 n.10 (1975)
(declaring that the trier of fact may consider both product's prior history and
the manufacturer's adherence to industry-wide standards and practices); see,
e.g., Honolulu Ltd. v. Cain, 244 Md. 590, 598, 224 A.2d 433, 437 (1966) (hold-
ing that "[c ]onformance to an industry standard is of course weighty evidence
that the action in question is reasonable and non-negligent. When circum-
stances make the customary method 'inherently dangerous or obviously im-
proper' the duty of reasonable care requires a change from ordinary prac-
tice.").
134. See Mondshour v. General Motors Corp., 298 . Supp. 111, 114 (D. Md. 1969)
(noting that reasonableness is determined at the time of manufacture, not
time of trial); Lundgren v. Ferno-Washington Co., 80 Md. App. 522, 526, 565
A.2d 335, 337 (1989) (allowing testimony of an expert that manufacturer's
product was unreasonably dangerous because the locking mechanism required
the operator to engage the lock manually instead of locking automatically and
that the only thing holding the mechanism in place was friction); see also Dig-
ges & Billmyre, supra note 8, at 23; Robb, supra note 3, at 8 ("In negligent de-
sign cases, courts admit state of the art evidence as a measure of the manufac-
turer's duty to use reasonable care in design.").
135. See 1 MADDEN, supra note 36, § 12.13, at 528 (noting that in design defect ac-
tions, evidence of an alternative design is relevant to prove whether a manu-
facturer fulfilled its duty of care). In one notable Maryland case, the plaintiff
presented evidence that the manufacturer did not incorporate its own pat-
ented device to alleviate the danger of its product. See American Laundry
Mach. Indus. v. Horan, 45 Md. App. 97, 106-08, 412 A.2d 407, 414-15 (1980).
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isted.136 However, such evidence is not controlling137 insofar as
courts do not expect a manufacturer to incorporate "the ultimate
in safety features." 38 Thus, state of the art evidence simply bolsters
the argument that a safer alternative design existed, 39 and that the
manufacturer failed to exercise reasonable care in failing to adopt
the alternative design."
A defendant can also offer state of the art evidence to demon-
strate that there were no superior designs available.' 4' Generally,
this is accomplished by showing that it implemented a state of the
art design when it manufactured the product. 42 If the evidence pro-
duced by the defendant shows that the design in question is state of
the art, the evidence buttresses its argument that it exercised rea-
sonable care 143 and may result in a directed verdict for the defend-
136. See, e.g., Garst v. General Motors Corp., 484 P.2d 47, 61 (Kan. 1971) (noting
that the "need to show that there was a defect of some kind in design and not
merely that a better design might have been conceived"). See geineraly RESTATE-
MENT OF THE LAW (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. b (1997) (ex-
plaining that "in most cases involving defective design the plaintiff must prove
the availability of an alternative reasonable design").
137. 3 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, § 18.03[2], at 18-66.
138. 1 MADDEN, supra note 36, at 529; see also Mondshour, 298 F. Supp. at 114 (not-
ing that although there may be an alternative design, courts hold manufactur-
ers liable by a "standard of reasonable safe design, not safest possible de-
sign"); Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 274 Md. 288, 295, 336 A.2d 118, 122-
23 (1975) (quoting Volkswagen of Am. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 217, 321 A.2d
737, 745 (1974)); Robb, supra note 3, at 8-9 ("In negligent design cases .... a
manufacturer's noncompliance with the then-existing state of the art would
not automatically result in a finding of negligence."). Likewise, Stuart Madden
argues that courts should not hold manufacturers liable solely because they
use lighter, less durable products than other manufacturers in the same indus-
try; much like evidence of alternative designs, evidence of other manufactur-
ers' materials does not directly prove that the product was unsuitable for its
intended purpose. See 1 MADDEN, supra note 36, at 529; see also Hull v. Eaton
Corp., 825 F.2d 448, 453-55 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("[E]vidence of a design alterna-
tive, by itself, is not sufficient to impose liability on the manufacturer." (quot-
ing Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Nutt, 407 A.2d 606, 611 (D.C. App. 1979))); 3
FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, § 18.03[2], at 18-66.
139. See 1 MADDEN, supra note 36, at 528 (noting the relevance of the alternative
designs and safety precautions of other manufacturers to prove design defect
and the feasibility of safety devices).
140. See Powell & Hill, supra note 111, at 85-87.
141. See 1 MADDEN, supra note 36, § 12.13, at 529-30.
142. See Digges & Billmyre, supra note 8, at 52 n.302 (noting that manufacturers
would likely use state of the art evidence to disprove allegations of defect
based in negligence).
143. See Powell & Hill, supra note 11l, at 85-87. In making this determination,
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ant.'" When a manufacturer does not implement a state of the art
design, its defense should focus on the elements considered by Ma-
ryland courts in their risk-utility analysis. 145 For example, a defend-
ant could assert that the costs of implementing the design would
destroy the economic utility of the product' 46 and that the alterna-
tive design does not create substantial benefits in safety. 47
Unlike negligent manufacturing defect cases, there are several
more compelling reasons for framing design defect claims in negli-
courts may also consider, but are not controlled by, the manufacturer's adher-
ence to federal statutes or regulations. See also Howard v. McCrory Corp., 601
E2d 133, 138 (4th Cir. 1979).
144. As one commentator explained:
[T]hough state of the art is not a recognized affirmative defense in
negligent products actions, its admissibility may have the same practi-
cal result. If the defendant manufacturer introduces evidence estab-
lishing that the technology of its product had advanced only so far at
the time of the product's manufacture, and if it shows that its prod-
uct incorporated these latest innovations, then, unless the plaintiff
can adduce some evidence of an alternative, technologically-possible
design or of the defendant's failure to use the latest technology,
some courts will direct a verdict for the defendant.
Robb, supra note 3, at 7 (citing Dreiling v. General Elec. Co., 511 F.2d 768
(5th Cir. 1975); Wiska v. St. Stanislaus Soc. Club, Inc., 390 N.E.2d 1133 (Mass.
App. 1979)).
145. See Troja v. Black & Decker Mfg., 62 Md. App. 101, 108, 488 A.2d 516, 519
(1985) (quoting Wade, supra note 74, at 17). Professor Wade revised these
considerations to include:
the usefulness and desirability of the product-its utility to the user
and to the public as a whole[; t]he safety aspects of the product-the
likelihood it will cause injury, and the probable seriousness of the in-
jury[; t]he availability of a substitute product which would meet the
same need and not be as safe[; t]he manufacturer's ability to elimi-
nate the unsafe character of the product without impairing its useful-
ness or making it too expensive to maintain its utility... [; t]he feasi-
bility on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the loss by
setting the price of the product or carrying liability insurance.
Wade, supra note 3, at 837-38.
146. See Toj'a, 62 Md. App. at 108, 488 A.2d at 519 (incorporating the expense of
correcting the unsafe nature of the product into the utility prong of the risk-
utility test).
147. See 3 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, § 18.03[2], at 18-63 to 18-66 (citing
Murphy v. Chestnut Mountain Lodge, Inc., 464 N.E.2d 818 (Ill. App. Ct.
1984); Rucker v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 396 N.E.2d 534 (Ill. 1979); Connelly v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 540 N.E.2d 370 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989)); 1 MADDEN, supra note
36, § 12.13, at 528-30 (noting that some courts view a defendant's use of state
of the art evidence as a nonprejudicial rebuttal to the plaintiff's evidence of
alternative design).
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gence instead of strict liability. If a plaintiff cannot demonstrate that
a product could be made safer, then strict liability may be pre-
cluded because the product is not unreasonably dangerous.'" Addi-
tionally, in certain design defect scenarios, Maryland courts have
disregarded the distinction between strict liability and negligence. 49
Thus, a plaintiff that is hesitant about alleging a count in negli-
gence, because evidence of due care could have an adverse effect
on the jury, may not be able to preclude the defendant from intro-
ducing evidence that its product was state of the art. 50 Similarly, in-
adequate warning claims brought in negligence and strict liability
appear to overlap.
C. Failure to Warn
Under a negligence theory, a manufacturer may be liable for
injury or damage that was the result of its failure to adequately
warn of the dangers of the product it manufactures. 15' In order for
148. See Griggs v. BIC Corp., 981 F2d 1429, 1434 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that be-
cause the plaintiff did not contend that the product was unsafe for its in-
tended use, it was not defective as a matter of law); Doe v. Miles Lab., Inc.,
927 F.2d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 1991) (noting that under Maryland law, "a product
is not unreasonably dangerous if it is determined to be unavoidably unsafe")
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
149. See Polansky v. Ryobi Am. Corp., 760 . Supp. 85, 87 (D. Md. 1991). In this de-
sign defect case, the court observed: "The element of a negligence action and
a strict liability action are the same 'with the exception that in negligence
plaintiff must show a breach of a duty of care by defendant while in strict lia-
bility plaintiff must show that the product was unreasonably dangerous." I&
(quoting Werner v. Upjohn, 628 E2d 848, 858 (4th Cir. 1980)).
150. See infra notes 2-15 and accompanying text.
151. See Singleton v. International Harvester Co., 685 F2d 112, 117 (4th Cir. 1989)
(affirming a trial court's refusal to submit a negligent duty to warn case to the
jury when the plaintiff failed to establish liability under strict liability for a fail-
ure to warn of possible injuries associated with tractor); Higgins v. Diversey
Corp., 998 F Supp. 598, 605 (D. Md. 1997) (refusing to hold a drug manufac-
turer liable for not warning consumers of unforeseeable injuries); Doe, 927
F.2d at 194-95 (refusing to hold a manufacturer liable because it could not
reasonably foresee the possibility of its product contributing to the transmis-
sion of AIDS); Eagle-Picher Indus. v. Balbos, 326 Md. 179, 197, 604 A.2d 445,
453 (1992) (holding a manufacturer liable for negligent failure to warn, de-
spite its inability to foresee the specific type of injury suffered); Moran v.
Faberg6, Inc., 273 Md. 538, 555, 332 A.2d 11, 21 (1975) (concluding that the
issue of reasonable foreseeability, even when a product is not used as in-
tended, is a matter for the jury); Nicholson v. Yamaha Motor Co., 80 Md. App.
695, 712, 566 A.2d 135, 144 (1989) (holding that a motorcycle manufacturer
had no duty to warn the plaintiff of lower leg injuries); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1965); Madden, supra note 14, at 235. A related is-
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a duty to warn to arise, the danger presented by the use of the
product in absence of an adequate warning must be unreasona-
ble. 52 Thus, a manufacturer must warn product users when there is
"a reasonable probability of injury" in the absence of a warning.'53
In a products liability case based on negligent failure to warn,
the assessment of whether an unreasonable risk exists entails a bal-
ancing of the probability and the seriousness of the harm with the
costs of taking appropriate precautions. 5 4 This type of risk-utility ap-
proach, however, has received criticism because it provides little
framework for analyzing failure to warn claims.'"5 A court's emphasis
on the nominal burden that a warning places on a manufacturer
significantly undermines the usefulness of this analytical tool. 56
Courts viewing the cost of providing a warning as the central factor
to the utility prong will almost undoubtedly find that it is out-
weighed by the risk of harm to the user in the absence of a warn-
ing.1 57 This may indicate one reason why courts place more empha-
sue is whether the defendant has exercised reasonable care in formulating
and updating its warning. See Werner v. Upjohn, 628 E2d 848, 858 (4th Cir.
1980). This issue is of prime importance in cases addressing unavoidably dan-
gerous drugs, for which strict liability is unavailable. See id. (discussing com-
ment k of section 402A).
152. See, e.g., Doe, 927 F.2d at 194 (citing Chambers v. G.D. Searle & Co., 441 F.
Supp. 377, 381 (D. Md. 1975)); McAlpin v. Leeds & Northrup Co., 912 F.
Supp. 207, 209 (W.D. Va. 1996) (stating that under a theory of negligence, the
focus is on whether the manufacturer's failure to warn was unreasonable); Ea-
gle-Picher Indus., 326 Md. at 194-95, 604 A.2d at 452 (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 95). See generally Madden, supra note 14, at 235 ("[T]he
duty to warn under negligence principles is triggered where the potential for
harm from the use of the product without warnings or instructions is 'signifi-
cant.'").
153. Katz v. Arundel-Brooks Concrete Corp., 220 Md. 200, 204, 151 A.2d 731, 733
(1959).
154. See Moran, 273 Md. at 543, 332 A.2d at 15.
155. See James A. Henderson & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products Lia-
bility and the Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.YU. L. REv. 265, 270 (1990)
("Concepts such as ... risk-utility balancing . . . are so devoid of content in
the failure-to-warn context that they cannot hope to test the bona fides of the
plaintiff's claim.").
156. See id. at 293-94; Madden, supra note 14, at 241-42. However, Henderson and
Twerski note that the utility factor of providing an additional warning might
weigh in favor of a manufacturer because consumers inundated with excessive
warnings may fail to heed those more crucial to safe use of the product. See
Henderson & Twerski, supra note 155, at 296-97 (charging courts and com-
mentators with the erroneous assumption that warnings are costless).
157. See Madden, supra note 14, at 241-42; Richard N. Pearson, Strict Liability and
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sis on resolving the foreseeability and knowledge elements of an
inadequate warning claim.
A manufacturer's failure to warn may create a foreseeable 58
and avoidable risk of harm. 5 9 To recover under a failure to warn
claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that it was reasonably foresee-
able that harm would result from the use or exposure to the prod-
uct in the absence of warnings. 60 Foreseeability plays a crucial role
in the duty to warn context and has been interpreted quite expan-
sively by the Court of Appeals of Maryland. 161
In Moran v. Fabergi,162 the seminal Maryland failure to warn
case, the court of appeals declared that "[t] he manner in which the
risk culminates in harm may be unusual, improbable and highly
unexpectable . . . . And yet, if the harm suffered falls within the
general danger area, there may be liability." 63 Therefore, although
Failure to Warn, 3 PROD. LIAB. L.J. 108, 111 (1992). According to one
commentator:
It perhaps would be an unusual case in which a manufacturer could
avoid negligence liability for failing to warn of a hazardous character-
istic by arguing that a warning would not have been cost effective.
Courts tend to look at warnings as relatively cheap, although there
are costs to warnings that courts frequently overlook.
Pearson, supra, at 111.
158. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 388, 395 (1965).
159. See WiLAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 31 (4th ed. 1971).
160. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 395 (1965).
161. See Moran v. Faberg6, Inc., 273 Md. 538, 544, 332 A.2d 11, 15 (1975); Twom-
bley v. Fuller Brush Co., 221 Md. 476, 158 A.2d 110 (1960); Katz v. Arundel
Corp., 220 Md. 200, 151 A.2d 731 (1959). The Moran court noted that one rea-
son foreseeability plays such an important role in the negligent failure to warn
analysis is because the cost of correcting the deficiency, placing a warning on
the label, heavily favors the plaintiff. See Moran, 273 Md. at 543-44, 332 A.2d at
15.
162. 273 Md. 538, 332 A.2d 11 (1975). In Moran, the plaintiff brought suit after be-
ing burned by a burst of fire when her friend attempted to scent a lit candle
with a Faberg6 cologne. See id. at 541, 332 A.2d at 13. In reversing the court of
special appeals and the circuit court's decisions, the court of appeals held:
[Iln the products liability domain a duty to warn is imposed on a
manufacturer if the item it produces has an inherent and hidden
danger about which the producer knows, or should know, could be a
substantial factor in bringing injury to an individual or his property
when the manufacturer's product comes near to or in contact with
the elements which are present normally in the environment where
the product can reasonably be expected to be brought or used.
Id.
163. Id. at 551, 332 A.2d at 19 (quoting FOWLER HARPER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 7 (1933)).
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a manufacturer may assume that its product will be put to its antici-
pated use, 64 the manufacturer may still be found liable for the dan-
gers of a product that flow from a noncustomary, but nonetheless
foreseeable use.1 65 Maryland appellate courts have reasoned that
"[t]he pertinent inquiry . . . is not whether the harm that oc-
curred-the actual use-was itself foreseeable, but rather whether it
fell 'within a general field of danger which should have been antici-
pated.'" 166 This concept of foreseeability calls on a court to consider
164. The court of appeals noted that it was not necessary for the plaintiff to
demonstrate that the manufacturer foresaw or should have foreseen the pre-
cise manner in which the accident would occur-that their cologne would be
used to scent a lit candle. See id. at 553, 332 A.2d at 20 (stating that it is only
necessary that the manufacturer be able to foresee possible danger if its prod-
uct comes into contact with elements normally found in the environment
where the product will be used). Rather, the plaintiff's evidence was sufficient
to show the following: the cologne possessed a latent danger of flammability;
persons at Faberg6 knew or should have known of the latent danger; it was
normal to find a flame and cologne in a home; it was reasonably foreseeable
to Faberg6 that the two might come in contact; and, a manufacturer, knowing
of the cologne's dangerous propensity, should have warned consumers. See id.
at 554, 332 A.2d at 21; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 395 cmL j
(1965). Comment j reads in pertinent part:
Unforeseeable use or manner of use. The liability stated in this Section is
limited to persons who are endangered and the risks which are cre-
ated in the course of uses of the chattel which the manufacturer
should reasonably anticipate. In the absence of special reason to ex-
pect otherwise, the maker is entitled to assume that his product will
be put to a normal use, for which the product is intended or appro-
priate; and he is not subject to liability when it is safe for all such
uses, and harm results only because it is mishandled in a way which
he has no reason to expect, or is used in some unusual and unfore-
seeable manner.
Id. § 395 cmt. j. To further support its analysis, the Moran court also relied on
comment k, which declares in pertinent part: "The manufacturer may, how-
ever, reasonably anticipate other uses than the one for which the chattel is
primarily used." Id. cmt. k.
165. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 395 cmt. k (1965). See genera//y Madden,
supra note 14, at 237-39.
166. American Laundry Mach. Indus. v. Horan, 45 Md. App. 97, 104, 412 A.2d 407,
413 (1980) (quoting Segerman v. Jones, 256 Md. 109, 132, 259 A.2d 794, 805
(1969)). In American Laundry Machine Industries, the Court of Special Appeals
of Maryland, relying on the Moran court's expansive view of foreseeability,
held that injuries sustained from an exploding commercial drying machine,
being used to dry a hot air balloon, were sufficiently foreseeable to require
the issue of negligence to be resolved by the jury. See id. at 108, 412 A.2d at
414-15.
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a manufacturer's knowledge, whether actual or constructive. The Re-
statement (Second) of Torts and subsequent case law adopting its provi-
sions and comments provide direct support for focusing on this
knowledge component.
The negligence standard that measures a seller's or manufac-
turer's duty to warn derives primarily from section 388 of the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts.167 Under this section, the standard of lia-
bility for failure to warn is whether a manufacturer or supplier has
"reason to know" 168 of the dangerous propensities of the product.' 69
While this section sets forth the general principles of a manufac-
turer's duty to warn, Maryland courts hold manufacturers to a more
exacting standard.70
167. See Moran, 273 Md. at 544, 332 A.2d at 15 (implementing the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1965)). Section 388 provides that:
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for an-
other to use is subject to liability to those whom the supplier should
expect to use the chattel with the consent of the other or to be en-
dangered by its probable use, for physical harm caused by the use of
the chattel in the manner for which and by a person for whose use it
is supplied, if the supplier (a) knows or has reason to know that the
chattel is or is likely to be dangerous for the use for which it is sup-
plied, and (b) has reason to believe that those for whose use the
chattel is supplied will realize its dangerous condition, and (c) fails
to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous condi-
tion or of the facts which make it likely to be dangerous.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1965). While section 388 only men-
tions sellers, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS section 394 explains that a man-
ufacturer's duties are the same as a seller. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 394 cmt. a. In particular, comment a provides that: "[tihe manufacturer of a
chattel is under those general liabilities which are common to all suppliers of
chattels for the use of others." Id.
168. According to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, courts considering the
.reason to know" standard focus on whether "the actor has information from
which a person of reasonable intelligence or of the superior intelligence of
the actor would infer that the fact in question exists, or that such person
would govern his conduct upon the assumption that such fact exists." RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 12(1).
169. See Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Balbos, 326 Md. 179, 202-03, 604 A.2d 445, 446
(1992) (holding that a nonmanufacturing seller that acts merely as a conduit
of goods will be held to the "reason to know standard" of sections 12, 388,
and 401 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS).
170. See, e.g., Doe v. Miles Lab., Inc., 927 F2d 187, 194 (4th Cir. 1991); Bottazzi v.
Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., 664 F.2d 49 (5th Cir. 1981); Higgins v. Diversey
Corp., 998 F. Supp. 598, 605 (D. Md. 1997); United States Gypsum Co. v.
Mayor of Baltimore, 336 Md. 145, 164-65, 647 A.2d 405, 414-15 (1994); Eag/e-
Picher Indus., 326 Md. at 195, 604 A.2d at 452 (citing Babylon v. Scruton, 215
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For a manufacturer, the heightened duty of care takes into ac-
count what the manufacturer knows or should have known about
any hazardous propensities of the product.' Unlike the "reason to
know standard," the "should have known" standard creates an af-
firmative duty on the part of the manufacturer to discover the dan-
gers a product imposes on foreseeable consumers that use the prod-
uct in any foreseeable manner. 72 Thus, in a negligent failure to
warn case, a manufacturer "is held responsible for knowing what
was generally known in the scientific or expert community about
the product's hazards."17 3 As such, a manufacturer must remain fully
apprized of all developments relevant to its product. 74 This affirma-
Md. 299, 304, 138 A.2d 375, 378 (1958)); Moran, 273 Md. at 552, 332 A.2d at
20.
171. See, e.g., Eagle-Picher Indus., 326 Md. at 195-200, 604 A.2d at 452-56 (holding
suppliers and installers that are more than mere conduits will be held to the
.should have known" standard of manufacturers); Moran, 273 Md. at 552, 332
A.2d at 20; United States Gypsum Co., 336 Md. at 164, 647 A.2d at 414 (approv-
ing a jury instruction holding manufacturers and sellers to a "should have
known" standard in a duty to warn case); see also, e.g., RESrATEmENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 12(2) (1965). Section 12(2) reads:
The words "should know" are used throughout the Restatement to
denote the fact that a person of reasonable prudence and intelli-
gence or of the superior intelligence of the actor would ascertain the
fact in question in the performance of his duty to another, or would
govern his conduct upon the assumption that such fact exists.
Id.
172. See Madden, supra note 14, at 226-27.
173. United States Gypsum Co., 336 Md. at 165, 647 A.2d at 415-16 (citing Eage-
Picker Indus., 326 Md. at 194-95, 604 A.2d at 452; Babylon, 215 Md. at 304, 138
A.2d at 378). Courts have held that under this standard, a manufacturer is
held to the level of an expert in the field. See Eagle-Picher Indus., 326 Md. at
195, 604 A.2d at 452; Babylon, 215 Md. at 304, 138 A.2d at 378 ("[A] person
who undertakes such manufacturing will be held to the skill of an expert in
that business and to an expert's knowledge of the arts, materials, and
processes. Thus he must keep reasonably abreast of scientific knowledge and
discoveries touching his product.. . ." (quoting 2 HARPER & JAMES. supra note
21, § 28.4)). However, evidence that an injury has never before been seen nor
published in national literature is admissible to determine the state of the art.
See Higgins, 998 . Supp. at 605.
174. See Babylon, 215 Md. at 304, 138 A.2d at 378; HARPER &JAMES, supra note 21, §
28.4, at 350; see also Braun v. Roux Distrib. Co., 312 S.W.2d 758, 763 (Mo.
1958) (stating that the appellant is required to keep reasonably abreast of sci-
entific knowledge and discoveries concerning his field); Beshada v. Johns-
Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 545-46 (N.J. 1982). However, the duty to
warn for drug manufacturers may be lower than that for other products. It re-
quires medical consensus, not merely a potential espoused in medical litera-
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tive duty to seek out and warn of certain expert knowledge becomes
the central element to establishing the relevance of state of the art
evidence when a negligence claim is brought for an inadequate
warning."'
The element of what the defendant should have known con-
tains a temporal restriction. 76 Maryland adopted the majority view 177
that manufacturers are held to what they "should have known at
the time the products were manufactured or sold."178 Therefore, a
manufacturer can argue that, at the time of manufacture, the state
of the art did not contemplate the general harm caused. 79 The ex-
pansive view of foreseeability, combined with the heightened stan-
dard of knowledge imputed to manufacturers, however, would seem
to work more in the plaintiff's favor.
The "should have known" requirement in the failure to warn
scenario includes more than merely the "evidence from the general
scientific community."18° It imputes not only "scientifically discovera-
ture: "If pharmaceutical companies were required to warn of every suspected
risk that could possibly attend the use of a drug, the consuming public would
be so barraged with warnings that it would undermine the effectiveness of
these warnings." Doe, 927 E2d at 194.
175. See infra note 180-84 and accompanying text.
176. The temporal element varies from state to state. See 6 SPEISER ET AL, supra note
1, § 18:166.
177. See Pearson, supra note 157, at 109-11. The majority view measures the manu-
facturer's knowledge by considering the state of the art at the time of sale. See
id; PRODUCrS LIABILrIY PRACnCE GUIDE, supra note 28, § 15.05[8] at 15-126. The
minority view that has received its fair share of criticism focuses on the state
of the art at the time that case is at trial. See Pearson, supra note 157, at 109-
11.
178. See United States Gypsum Co., 336 Md. at 165, 647 A.2d at 415; see also Doe, 927
E2d at 194 (dating the knowledge requirement at the time the drug was ad-
ministered).
179. See Eagle-Picher Indus., 326 Md. at 195, 604 A.2d at 453 (permitting the manu-
facturer to argue that at the time of manufacture the state of the art pre-
cluded it from foreseeing the connection between asbestos and the disease
mesothelioma). However, courts will hold a manufacturer nonetheless liable if
it can foresee an injury of the general type suffered by the plaintiff. See id. at
196-97, 604 A.2d at 453 (holding that even though the manufacturer may not
have foreseen that the plaintiff would contract mesothelioma, an asbestos-
related disease, its ability to foresee the possibility of asbestosis or any lung
disease in general supported a jury verdict for negligent failure to warn).
180. United States Gypsum Co., 336 Md. at 164, 647 A.2d at 414. It appears that in
Maryland, "[t]he knowledge of one manufacturer can be a proper basis for
concluding that another manufacturer should have warned of a specific de-
fect." Id.
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ble" information to a manufacturer or seller, but also "what other
manufacturers and sellers knew about their products." 8' Thus, a
plaintiff can use state of the art evidence to prove "any other knowl-
edge that may be available" to any manufacturer in the defendant's
field. 82 For example, in United States Gypsum Co. v. Mayor of Balti-
more, 83 the court of appeals permitted one corporation's internal
correspondence regarding that corporation's knowledge of a prod-
uct to be used as state of the art evidence to prove the should have
known element in a negligent failure to warn case brought against a
separate corporate entity 84
The knowledge standards enunciated by the Maryland appellate
courts in negligent duty to warn cases have particular significance in
strict products liability because the same knowledge components are
applied. 85 This application of negligence standards in strict liability
cases further strengthens the degree of congruity between the two
theories in the inadequate warning context. 86 Indeed, Maryland,
like many other jurisdictions, has developed a strict liability jurispru-
dence that retains many of the concepts developed in negligence
cases, particularly in the context of inadequate warnings and design
defects 87
181. Id.
182. Id. at 168, 647 A.2d at 416.
183. 336 Md. 145, 647 A.2d 405 (1994).
184. See id. at 167-68, 647 A.2d at 416.
185. See ACandS, Inc. v. Abate, 121 Md. App. 590, 614, 710 A.2d 944, 956 (1988).
According to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland:
'In an asbestos product liability failure to warn action sounding in
strict liability or negligence and brought against a manufacturer or a
distributor-installer, a plaintiff must show that the defendant knew or
should have known that distribution of the product involved an un-
reasonable risk of causing physical harm to the consumer.'
Id. (quoting ACandS, Inc. v. Godwin, 340 Md. 334, 397-98, 667 A.2d 116, 254-
55 (1995)). Compare supra notes 149-84 and accompanying text, with infra notes
188-215 and accompanying text.
186. See infra notes 298-308 and accompanying text. See generally Henderson & Twer-
ski, supra note 155, at 271-79 (discussing the significant overlap between negli-
gent failure to warn and strict liability failure to warn).
187. According to two commentators: [I]n both defective-design and failure-to-
warn cases, cost-benefit balancing is inevitably required to determine product
defectiveness. Because cost-benefit balancing is also at the heart of negligence,
it is no easy matter in design and warning cases to discover a difference be-
tween strict liability and negligence . . . . After years of frustration, many
courts have finally abandoned the search and declared that, for all intents and
purposes, strict liability, as applied to generically dangerous product cases, was
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V. STRICT LIABILITY
Strict liability allows a court to imply negligence; thus, it has
been likened to negligence per se.'8 8 As such, there is often an over-
lap between the elements of a strict liability cause of action and the
relevant features of a case brought in negligence. 8 9 Recognizing
those overlaps provides assistance in predicting the admissibility of
state of the art evidence in suits grounded in strict liability.
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, adopted by an
overwhelming majority of states, 19° sets forth the general rule of
strict liability. 91 According to section 402A, a seller will be held lia-
ble for any injury resulting from the intended use of its defective
product, 192 notwithstanding the seller's exercise of all possible
care.193 In Phipps v. General Motor Corp.," the Court of Appeals of
Maryland adopted section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 95
simply negligence by another name. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 155, at
271-72.
188. As the Phipps court explained:
Although the plaintiff need not prove any specific act of negligence
on the part of the seller, as in other product liability cases, proof of a
defect existing in the product at the time it leaves the seller's control
must still be presented. As one commentator has observed, the doc-
trine of strict liability is really but another form of negligence per se,
in that it is a judicial determination that placing a defective product
on the market which is unreasonably dangerous to a user or con-
sumer is itself a negligent act sufficient to impose liability on the
seller.
Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 351, 363 A.2d 955, 962 (1976)
(quoting Wade, supra note 74, at 14).
189. See infra notes 190-217 and accompanying text.
190. See Joseph E. Martineau, Note, The Duty to Warn Under Strict Products Liability as
Limited by the Knowledge Requirement: A Regretful Retention of Negligence Concepts,
26 ST. Louis U. LJ. 125, 125 n.12 (1981) (noting that 43 states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia have adopted strict liability).
191. See Phipps, 278 Md. at 352, 363 A.2d at 963.
192. The plaintiff's burden of proving defect distinguishes strict liability from abso-
lute liability. See 3 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, § 18.03[4], at 18-65 (quot-
ing O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298 (N.J. 1983)).
193. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). Underlying section 402A
is the policy that the public has a right to expect protection against accidental
injuries that are caused by defective and dangerous products and that this
burden most logically falls on those who manufacture, supply, and sell the
products. See id.
194. 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976).
195. See id. at 353, 363 A.2d at 963 (concluding that a cause of action brought
under strict liability by a party injured by a defective and unreasonably dan-
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The Phipps court explained that to establish a claim under section
402A, a plaintiff is required to demonstrate four elements: (1) the
product was in a defective condition at the time that it left the pos-
session or control of the seller, (2) that it was unreasonably danger-
ous to the user or consumer, (3) that the defect was a cause of the
injuries, and (4) that the product was expected to and did reach
the consumer without substantial change in its condition. 96 Thus,
Maryland courts apply the majority rule' 97 that in order to recover
under section 402A, the plaintiff must prove that the product at is-
sue was both defective'98 and unreasonably dangerous. 199
Although the Phipps court did not officially adopt any of the
comments2°° to section 402A, it noted that several of the comments
could be used as a defense to claims grounded in strict liability.20'
Thus, the Phipps court made clear that "[d]espite the use of the
term 'strict liability' the seller is not an insurer, as absolute liability
is not imposed on the seller for any injury resulting from the use of
his product."20 2 While defenses to strict liability include a plaintiff's
failure to read or follow the given instructions2°3 and misuse of the
gerous product is valid in Maryland).
196. See id. at 344, 363 A.2d at 958.
197. See Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 544 F.2d 442, 447 (10th Cir. 1976) (citing
Kleve v. General Motors Corp., 210 N.W.2d 568 (Iowa 1973)); C & K Lord,
Inc. v. Carter, 74 Md. App. 68, 87, 536 A.2d 699, 708 (1988); Brown v. Western
Farmers Ass'n, 521 P.2d 537 (Or. 1974); Jagmin v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 211
N.W.2d 810 (Wis. 1973).
198. A defect is not simply a condition that creates a risk of harm; it is some type
of imperfection, whether in design, manufacture, or warning. See Singleton v.
Manitowoc Co., 727 E Supp. 217, 221 (D. Md. 1989).
199. Phipps, 278 Md. at 344, 363 A.2d at 959 ("For a seller to be liable under §
402A, the product must be both in a 'defective condition' and 'unreasonably
dangerous' at the time that it is placed on the market by the seller."); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965) (explaining that section
402A only applies if the "defective condition of the product makes it unrea-
sonably dangerous to the user or consumer"). But see Wade, supra note 74, at
14-15 (explaining that "defective" is synonymous with "unreasonably danger-
ous"); Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1087 n.20 (5th
Cir. 1973).
200. The Phipps court's discussion of the strict liability standard made use of the
comments' definitions of "defective condition" and "unreasonably danger-
ous." Phipps, 278 Md. at 344, 363 A.2d at 958 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402A cmts. g, i).
201. See id. at 346, 363 A.2d at 959-60 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
402A cmts. g, h, j, n (1965).
202. Id at 351-52, 363 A.2d at 963.
203. See Simpson v. Standard Container Co., 72 Md. App. 199, 204-05, 527 A.2d
[Vol. 28
State of the Art Evidence in Products Liability
product,2°4 the increased emphasis on the manufacturer's knowl-
edge2°5 has brought issues of the admissibility of state of the art evi-
dence to the forefront.
State of the art evidence is particularly relevant to the temporal
element of knowledge-"What is known and when was this knowl-
edge available." 206 Unlike negligence suits, however, the relevance of
state of the art evidence in strict liability creates controversy and the
law is increasingly unsettled.27 The principal difference between a
negligence claim and strict liability claim is the shift in focus from
the conduct of the manufacturer to the product itself.208 Accordingly,
some courts and commentators conclude that a manufacturer's
knowledge of a risk or hazard is irrelevant.2°9 Jurisdictions employ-
1337, 1340 (1987).
204. See id. at 204-06, 527 A.2d at 1340-41.
205. In the words of Stuart Madden:
Rather than confine evaluation of the meaning of unreasonably dan-
gerous to the monochromatic consideration of the consumer expec-
tations test, growing authority suggests that even under the principles
of strict liability, a product should be considered unreasonably dan-
gerous if the danger arises from mismanufacture, misdesign, or mis-
information by reference to the seller's actual or constructive
knowledge.
Madden, supra note 14, at 225 (footnote omitted).
206. Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 782 F.2d 1156, 1164 (4th Cir. 1986).
207. See 3 Frumer & Friedman, supra note 3, §18.03[4], at 18-58.
208. Phipps, 278 Md. at 344, 363 A.2d at 958 ("In strict liability, the plaintiff is not
required to impugn the conduct of the maker or other seller but he is re-
quired to impugn the product." (citing KEETON ET AL, supra note 65, § 99, at
695; Wade, supra note 74, at 17)).
209. See id. at 344, 363 A.2d at 958; see also Kisor v. Johns-Manville Corp., 783 F.2d
1337, 1441 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting Lenhardt v. Ford Motor Co., 683 P.2d
1097, 1100 (Wash. 1984) (declaring that a manufacturer's liability is deter-
mined by the product, not its behavior); Johnson v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc.,
740 P.2d 548, 549 (Haw. 1987) (noting the three elements listed under section
402A); KEETON ET AL, supra note 65, § 99, at 700. This reasoning is consistent
with the different burdens of proof a plaintiff bears under negligence and
strict liability. See Phipps, 278 Md. at 351, 363 A.2d at 962. To recover in negli-
gence, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant breached the duty of due
care, whereas in strict liability, a plaintiff must prove that the product was de-
fective and unreasonably dangerous. See Werner v. Upjohn Co., 682 F.2d 848,
858 (4th Cir. 1980). According to the Phipps court, strict liability is little more
than another form of negligence per se. See Phipps, 278 Md. at 351, 363 A.2d
at 962-63 (quoting Wade, supra note 74, at 14). However, the trend among
American jurisdictions is to admit state of the art evidence in strict liability
cases to demonstrate the knowledge of the defendant. See 1 FRUMER & FRIED-
MAN, supra note 3, § 8.04[4], at 8-205.
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ing this reasoning have held that state of the art evidence is inad-
missible in strict liability cases.2t 0 These jurisdictions impute knowl-
edge of a product's defective condition to the manufacturer."' The
rationale is that the scientific inability to discover the product's un-
reasonably dangerous nature does not excuse the fact that, ulti-
mately, the product may prove to be both defective and unreasona-
bly dangerous. 212
However, even under a strict liability theory, a manufacturer
will not be liable simply because an accident happened.213 Subject-
ing a manufacturer to liability, because it did not warn of unknown
dangers or incorporate designs that even experts did not contem-
plate, arguably transforms strict liability into absolute liability. A
court applying this logic may admit state of the art evidence to
demonstrate the manufacturer's knowledge of the alleged product
defect.2t 4 Specifically, state of the art evidence can be admitted to
demonstrate that the defect did not render the product unreasona-
bly dangerous because the product complied with the state of the
210. See, e.g., Kisor, 783 F.2d at 1141 (applying Washington law that compliance with
industry standards is not relevant in strict liability actions); Elmore v. Owens-
Illinois, Inc. 673 S.W.2d 434, 438 (Mo. 1984) (holding that state of the art evi-
dence has no bearing on the outcome of a strict liability claim in Missouri);
Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 546-49 (N.J. 1982) (hold-
ing that a product may be unsafe regardless of industry knowledge). See gener-
ally 3 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, § 18.03[4], at 18-71 to 18-72 (provid-
ing multiple cases and discussing the general argument made by these
courts).
211. See supra notes 208-10 and accompanying text.
212. See KEETON ET AL, supra note 65, § 99, at 700-01. Furthermore, "[i]t is gener-
ally agreed, however, that inability to prevent flaws from occurring will not ex-
cuse, but there is considerable diversity of opinion about inability to discover
or appreciate hazards related to the way products are designed or composed."
Id. at 701 (footnotes omitted).
213. Harrison v. Bill Cairns Pontiac, Inc., 77 Md. App. 41, 51, 549 A.2d 385, 390
(1988)(noting that a manufacturer cannot be held liable simply because an
accident occurred); Jensen v. American Motors Corp., 50 Md. App. 226, 229-
30, 437 A.2d 242, 244 (1989) (noting that the mere fact that an accident hap-
pens does not prove that a product was defective, but realizing that a litigant
can create a jury issue as to whether a defect in the product existed through
circumstantial evidence when -'the addition of very little more in the way of
facts.... may be enough to support the inference." (quoting W. Prosser, The
Fall of the Citadel 50 MINN. L REv. 791, 840.44 (1966)).
214. See Birnbaum & Wrubel, supra note 1, at 31; Daniel Webster Bishop, Com-
ment, Use of 'State of the Art' Evidence in Strict Liability Claims: The New Texas
Standard, 33 BAYLOR L. REv. 165, 171 (1981); Sobota, supra note 19, at 945-46.
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art.215
Deciding whether state of the art evidence is relevant may
hinge on the type of test a court employs to assess liability. Under
section 402A, products are judged defective and unreasonably dan-
gerous based on the expectations of consumers.216 However, mod-
ern courts have de-emphasized and, in some jurisdictions, aban-
doned the consumer expectations test, opting instead to apply the
risk-utility test.217 Maryland appears willing to apply both depending
on which type of strict liability claim is asserted.
A. Manufacturing Defect
In a strict liability claim that alleges a manufacturing defect-a
result of an error in the manufacturing process-the appropriate in-
quiry seeks to determine whether the product conformed to the
manufacturer's intended design or whether it deviated from the
other units of the product line.218 To recover for a manufacturing
215. See KEETON ET AL, supra note 65, § 99, at 700.
216. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965) ("The article sold
must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by
the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common
to the community as to its characteristics." (emphasis added)).
217. See Birnbaum & Wrubel, supra note 1, at 31 ("In some jurisdictions, courts
have noted that while strict liability may be appropriate in manufacturing de-
fect cases, negligence is the proper basis of liability in design and warning
cases where the test for defect is the risk-utility balancing of factors analysis.").
218. See Doe v. Miles Lab., Inc., 927 F.2d 187, 192 (4th Cir. 1991) (refusing to hold
a manufacturer liable for a manufacturing defect of which it could not have
knowledge nor against which it could not have screened at the time of manu-
facture); Stalkner v. General Motors Corp., 934 F. Supp. 179, 180 (D. Md.
1996) (holding that the plaintiff's expert presented insufficient evidence to
prove a specific deviation from the manufacturer's design); A.J. Decoster Co.
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 333 Md. 245, 247-48, 634 A.2d 1330, 1331 (1994)
(alleging that a transfer switch to a ventilation system was defectively manufac-
tured causing the loss of more than 140,000 chickens); Eaton Corp. v. Wright,
281 Md. 80, 85, 90, 375 A.2d 1122, 1125, 1127 (1977) (alleging that a distribu-
tor was strictly liable for a deformed valve core that rendered a propane fuel
container unreasonably dangerous); Zeigler v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., 74 Md.
App. 613, 620, 539 A.2d 701, 704 (1988) (citing Phipps v. General Motors
Corp., 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976)); see also Phipps, 278 Md. at 345, 363
A.2d at 959 (noting that jurisdictions readily adopt RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS section 402A for manufacturing defect strict liability cases); KEETON ET
AL, supra note 65, § 99, at 695 ("This is a far cry from negligence liability
since the target defendant is liable without proof that there was any negli-
gence on the part of the target defendant in creating or failing to discover
the flaw.").
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defect, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the manufacturer distrib-
uted the product in a defective condition,1 9 the product reached
the consumer without substantial change,2 ° the defect rendered the
product unreasonably dangerous,22' and the deviation 222 caused the
219. See Phipps, 278 Md. at 353, 363 A.2d at 963; see also A.J. Decoster Co., 333 Md. at
260, 634 A.2d at 1337; Harrison v. Bill Cairns Pontiac, Inc., 77 Md. App. 41,
48, 549 A.2d 385, 389 (1988) (holding that plaintiff's speculative expert testi-
mony combined with the fact that the evidence was destroyed five years after
manufacture did not produce sufficient evidence to infer a manufacturing de-
fect existed at the time it left the manufacturer); Eaton Corp., 281 Md. at 89-90,
375 A.2d at 1127 (noting that it was proper to infer that the product was in a
defective condition when it left the defendant's possession because the prod-
uct was used within one hour of its purchase); Jensen v. American Motors
Corp., 50 Md. App. 226, 231, 437 A.2d 242, 245 (1989) (explaining that defects
in manufacturing or design must exist when the product leaves the manufac-
turer's control).
220. See Phipps, 278 Md. at 353, 363 A.2d at 963; see also A.J. Decoster Co., 333 Md. at
260, 634 A.2d at 1337; C & K Lord, Inc. v. Carter, 74 Md. App. 68, 88, 536
A.2d 699, 708 (1988) (holding in a design defect case grounded in strict liabil-
ity that the disconnection of an automatic flood system of a conveyor created
a jury issue as to whether the product reached the consumer without substan-
tial change). However, "not every change made to a product after it leaves the
manufacturer suffices to preclude liability under § 402A .... [I]t seems that,
in most cases, the substantiality of the change is a question of fact, and if
there is any conflict in the evidence, it is for the jury to decide." Banks v. Iron
Hustler Corp., 59 Md. App. 408, 432, 475 A.2d 1243, 1255 (1984) (citations
omitted).
221. See Phipps, 278 Md. at 353, 363 A.2d at 963; see also A.J. Decoster Co., 333 Md. at
260, 634 A.2d at 1337. The Phipps court recognized instances in which a manu-
facturing or design defect would never be reasonable. See Phipps, 278 Md. at
345, 363 A.2d at 959 (citing Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d
69 (NJ. 1960) (new car's defective steering mechanism resulted in the auto-
mobile swerving off the road)); see also Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 451
P.2d 84 (Cal. 1969) (new automobile's drive shaft separates from the vehicle
under normal driving conditions); Sharp v. Chrysler Corp., 432 S.W.2d 131
(Tex. App. 1968) (new car's brakes fail); DEWEY ET AL, supra note 8, at 4.
222. Regarding a strict liability suit to recover a manufacturing defect, it is suffi-
cient to simply demonstrate that the product deviated from the manufac-
turer's design. See Koch v. Sports Health Home Care, No. 94-1346, 1995 WL
290409, at *5 (4th Cir. May 15, 1995) (citing Singleton v. International Har-
vester Co., 685 F2d 112, 117 (4th Cir. 1989)); see also KEETON ET AL, supra note
65, § 99, at 700 ("The scientific inability to avoid occasional flaws in products
due to miscarriages in the construction process has never altered the fact that
an impure or flawed product is defective if the product tends to be more dan-
gerous than it was intended to be."). However, a failure to present such evi-
dence is fatal to a manufacturing defect case. See Koch, 1995 WL 290409, at *5.
Although, unlike in negligence, a plaintiff does not have to demonstrate a spe-
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plaintiff's injury.223
In strict liability manufacturing defect cases, the Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland has stated a preference for the consumer expec-
tation test because of its simplicity in application. 24 Under the con-
sumer expectations test, when a product injures a consumer due to
a manufacturing defect, it will usually fail the expectations of the
reasonable consumer and will thus be deemed unreasonably dan-
gerous. 225 This standard calls for a comparison of a product against
the manufacturer's intendeai design.226 Generally, the manufac-
turer's negligent conduct or knowledge is irrelevant to the case. 227
This limited inquiry has little need for evidence of past potential al-
ternatives; therefore, state of the art evidence is arguably irrelevant
to the court's inquiry.228
cific action that deviated from the duty of due care, a plaintiff must demon-
strate specifically how the product deviated from the intended design. See Single-
ton, 685 F.2d at 115 (noting that to recover under a strict liability
manufacturing defect case, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the product
does not conform to the manufacturer's specifications). Compare Stalkner, 934
F Supp. at 180 (refusing to grant relief to the plaintiff for an alleged manu-
facturing defect because of the expert's failure to identify a specific deviation
from the manufacturer's design), with Eaton Corp., 281 Md. at 85, 90, 375 A.2d
at 1125, 1127 (affirming a verdict for the plaintiff when he presented, through
expert testimony, that a critical part of the manufacturer's product deviated
from its design and specifications).
223. See Phipps, 278 Md. at 353, 363 A.2d at 963; see also A.J. Decoster Co., 333 Md. at
260, 634 A.2d at 1337; Dudley v. Baltimore Gas & Elec., 98 Md. App. 182, 204,
632 A.2d 492, 502 (1993) (noting that the plaintiff failed to prove that the nat-
ural gas manufactured by the defendant was defective and erroneously as-
serted that because the gas caused the injury, the defective pipes that caused
the injury shall result in recovery from the defendant).
224. See Phipps, 278 Md. at 344, 363 A.2d at 959 (citing FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra
note 3, § 16(A)(4) at 3-318 to 3-320 (1976)); DEWEY ET AL., supra note 8, at 4).
Such a determination is for the court, not the jury. See DEWEY ET AL., supra
note 8, at 6.
225. See DEWEY ET AL., supra note 8, at 4.
226. See supra notes 54-62 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
228. See Reed v. Tiffin Motor Homes, Inc., 697 F.2d 1192, 1196, 1198 n.8 (4th Cir.
1982) (applying South Carolina law); Robb, supra note 3, at 14 ("Even the
most conservative defense counsel would agree that state of the art evidence
has no relevance to strict products actions involving manufacturing defects.");
cf. Johnson v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 740 P.2d 548, 549 (Haw. 1987) (hold-
ing that state of the art evidence was inadmissible for the purpose of establish-
ing a manufacturer's knowledge because such an inquiry was irrelevant in a
strict liability cause of action concerning an inherently unsafe product).
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The only way that state of the art evidence could be relevant in
a strict liability manufacturing defect case appears to be when a
manufacturer asserts that the product is unavoidably unsafe.229 For
example, in Doe v. Miles Laboratories, Inc., Cutter Laboratories Divi-
sion,23° the plaintiff alleged that Konyne, a drug made from blood,
was defectively manufactured because it was contaminated with
AIDS.231 The plaintiff alleged that the manufacturer failed to ade-
quately test the product.232 The manufacturer relied on what may be
fairly characterized as state of the art evidence, which demonstrated
that, at the time the product was manufactured and administered,
the medical community had not reached a consensus as to whether
AIDS could be transmitted through blood.233 Notably, the scientific
community did not know of the plaintiff's proposed screening pro-
cedures at the time of manufacture.
2 34
Relying on this evidence, the court conducted a risk-utility anal-
ysis to determine if the product was unreasonably dangerous.235 The
court relied upon comment k of section 402A of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts236 and deemed the product unavoidably unsafe. 237 Ac-
229. But see DEWEY ET AL., supra note 8, at 130 (concluding that "[s]tate of the art
evidence may only be relevant in strict liability design defect and failure to
warn cases, as manufacturing defects involve variance from the manufacturer's
self-imposed standards, whether current or not.").
230. 927 F.2d 187 (4th Cir. 1991). Before deciding the case, the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Maryland certified questions to the Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland. See Miles Lab. Inc. v. Doe, 315 Md. 704, 707, 556 A.2d 1107,
1109 (1989).
231. See Miles Lab., Inc., 315 Md. at 708-09, 556 A.2d at 1109; see also Doe, 927 F.2d at
189.
232. See Miles Lab., Inc., 315 Md. at 732, 556 A.2d at 1121; see also Doe, 927 F.2d at
191-92.
233. See Miles Lab., Inc., 315 Md. at 732, 556 A.2d at 1121; see also Doe, 927 F.2d at
191-92. But see DEWEY ET AL., supra note 8, at 131 (concluding that the other
questions certified to the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Doe v. Miles Lab.
Inc., precluded the court of appeals from considering state of the art evidence
in strict liability cases).
234. See Miles Lab., Inc., 315 Md. at 732, 556 A.2d at 1121; see also Doe, 927 F.2d at
191-92.
235. See Doe, 927 F.2d at 191. But see supra note 224 and accompanying text. Com-
ment k of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS section 402A provides the con-
siderations underlying the risk-utility test. See id.
236. Comment k to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS section 402A excludes the fol-
lowing from liability under a strict liability theory: "those products, drugs in
particular, which in the state of human knowledge, are incapable of being
safe for their intended and ordinary use (i.e. rabies vaccine), but where ex-
isting medical experience justifies the marketing and use of the product de-
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cordingly, the manufacturer was exempted from liability.2 38
Other than instances in which the unavoidably unsafe excep-
tion to strict liability is applied, it appears as though manufacturing
defect cases represent the only area of products liability that courts
employ strict liability in a conceptually pure form.2 39 However,
outside the realm of manufacturing defect cases, the struggle over
strictly applying section 402A is evident. The next section explores
this tension and demonstrates how state of the art evidence plays a
role in defining the contours of a design defect cause of action in
strict liability.
B. Design Defect
Despite the seemingly unqualified rejection of strict liability for
design defects by the court of appeals in Volkswagen of America, Inc.
v. Young,24° the court nonetheless accepted this cause of action in
Phipps v. General Motors Corp.241 In design defect cases based on a
strict liability theory, the elements that a plaintiff must prove to re-
cover essentially mirror those for manufacturing defect grounded in
spite the risk." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 402A cmt. k (1965). In its
consideration, the court of appeals invoked this provision. See Miles Lab., Inc.,
315 Md. at 732, 556 A.2d at 1121.
237. In deciding that the product was unavoidably unsafe, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit em-
phasized the utility of the product and the lack of available alternatives. See
Doe, 927 F.2d at 191-193; Miles Lab., Inc., 315 Md. at 732-34, 556 A.2d at 1121;.
The court of appeals specifically alluded to the use of state of the art evidence
in this rare circumstance by observing that "the manufacturer must demon-
strate 'that at the time of preparation or marketing of the product, the state of
the art had not progressed to where the risk was no longer unavoidable, and
that the product's benefits could not be achieved by a substitute product or in
another manner.'" Do4 315 Md. at 726, 556 A.2d at 1118 (quoting Belle Bon-
fils Mem'l Blood Bank v. Hansen, 665 P.2d 118, 120 (Colo. 1983)).
238. See Miles Lab., Inc., 315 Md. at 732-34, 556 A.2d at 1121; see also Doe, 927 F.2d at
191-93.
239. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
240. 272 Md. 201, 321 A.2d 737 (1974). According to the Volkswagen of America,
Inc. court:
[W]e are convinced that [§ 402A] has no proper application to liabil-
ity for design defects .... Since the existence of a defective design
depends upon the reasonableness of the manufacturer's action, and
depends upon the degree of care which he has exercised, it is wholly
illogical to speak of a defective design even though the manufacturer
has 'exercised all possible care' in preparation of his product.
Id. at 220-21, 321 A.2d at 747.
241. 278 Md. 337, 353, 363 A.2d 955, 963 (1976).
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strict liability.242 The principal distinction drawn between design de-
fect and manufacturing defect cases is that in a design defect case
the plaintiff is required to prove that the defendant's entire product
242. For an examination of these elements, see supra notes 218-39 and accompany-
ing text. See also Hull v. Eaton Corp., 825 F.2d 448, 453-55 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (al-
leging that the manufacturer's forklift design was defective because the bolts
were removable and one could not determine whether the counterweight was
properly attached from mere observation of the forklift); Singleton v. Interna-
tional Harvester Co., 685 F.2d 112, 114 (4th Cir. 1981) (alleging that a manu-
facturer should be held strictly liable for failing to incorporate a roll over pro-
tective structure in the design of its tractor); Rock v. Oster Corp., 810 F. Supp.
665, 666 (D. Md. 1991) (attempting to recover under strict liability for defec-
tive design of a fondue pot); Polansky v. Ryobi of Am. Corp., 760 F. Supp. 85,
86 (D. Md. 1991) (alleging that a manufacturer was liable for a design defect
under a strict liability theory for injuries incurred in the use of a miter saw);
Singleton v. Manitowoc Co., 727 F. Supp. 217, 218 (1989) (alleging design of a
crane was defective, subjecting a manufacturer to strict liability because it al-
lowed for blind spots); Kelley v. K.G. Indus., 304 Md. 124, 138, 497 A.2d 1143,
1149 (1985) (considering whether a handgun used in a killing constituted a
defectively designed product); Klein v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 92 Md. App.
477, 483-84, 608 A.2d 1276, 1280 (1992) (alleging that a radial saw was defec-
tive in design because it lacked a -lower blade guard and seeking recovery
under strict liability); Nicholson v. Yamaha Motor Co., 80 Md. App. 695, 716,
566 A.2d 135, 146 (1989) (alleging that a motorcycle was defectively designed,
subjecting the manufacturer to strict liability because it was not equipped with
a protective device to prevent lower leg injuries in an accident); Lundgren v.
Ferno-Washington, Co., 80 Md. App. 522, 526, 565 A.2d 335, 337 (1989) (alleg-
ing that a cart used to transport photocopiers was defectively designed); C &
K Lord, Inc. v. Carter, 74 Md. App. 68, 88, 536 A.2d 699, 708 (1988) (holding
that a plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to create a jury question as to
whether a conveyor was defectively designed because it did not incorporate
safety guards, thereby subjecting the defendant to strict liability); Zeigler v. Ka-
wasaki Heavy Indus., 74 Md. App. 613, 625, 539 A.2d 701, 707 (1987) (alleging
that a motorcycle manufacturer should be held strictly liable for a design de-
fect that failed to protect an operator's lower extremities in an accident);
Simpson v. Standard Container Co., 72 Md. App. 199, 202, 527 A.2d 1337,
1339 (1987) (considering whether a manufacturer should be held strictly lia-
ble for the design of a gasoline can because it lacked a childproof cap and
considering the same elements as those listed for manufacturing defects);
Troja v. Black & Decker Mfg., 62 Md. App. 101, 105, 488 A.2d 516, 518 (1985)
(alleging that a manufacturer should be held liable for failing to incorporate
a safety system for a radial arm saw); Banks v. Iron Hustler Corp., 59 Md. App.
408, 411, 475 A.2d 1243, 1243 (1984) (alleging that the defendant should be
held strictly liable for designing a conveyor without a shield); Sheehan v.
Anthony Pools, 50 Md. App. 614, 620 n.6, 440 A.2d 1085, 1089 n.6 (1982) (not-
ing that appellants alleged, on appeal, that the cost and utility elements of ap-
plying non-stick covering on a diving board were not outweighed by the risk
of designing the board without it).
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line, not just one product, is defective due to an improper design.243
If a plaintiff is forced to resort to circumstantial evidence to prove a
design defect, Maryland courts generally require "distinct circum-
stances described by the witnesses as well as expert testimony."244
Design defect cases create the greatest confusion as to what test
to apply--consumer expectations or risk-utility-as well as whether
a true distinction between negligence and strict liability exists. 245 Ma-
243. See Klein, 92 Md. App. at 485, 608 A.2d at 1280 (noting that in a design defect
case, a plaintiff may recover if the product's design "was actually intended by
the manufacturer," but is nonetheless defective). Ultimately, however, the
plaintiff must also prove that the product in fact malfunctioned. See Kelley, 304
Md. at 138, 497 A.2d at 1149 (1985) (holding that "a handgun that functions
as intended and as expected is not 'defective' within the reasoning of [§
402A]").
244. Jensen v. American Motors Corp., 50 Md. App. 226, 233, 437 A.2d 242, 246
(1981). For a discussion of the importance of expert testimony, see supra
notes 47-51 and accompanying text. Maryland courts also consider whether
the alleged defect is latent. The latent/patent rule generally will require a
court to hold that patent or obvious defects in design do not create an unrea-
sonable risk, whereas latent defects may. See Rock, 810 R Supp. at 667 (holding
that the risks in a fondue pot were so apparent so as to preclude a finding of
a unreasonable dangerousness under a risk-utility test); Banks, 59 Md. App. at
427, 475 A.2d at 1252 (contending that the latent/patent distinction has been
incorporated into the Wade factors and is not an absolute bar to recovery).
Notwithstanding the criticism of this consideration, the risk-utility test none-
theless incorporates such a consideration. See Phipps, 278 Md. at 345 n.4, 363
A.2d at 959 n.4 (listing the fourth consideration as "the obviousness of the
danger"). Although the latent/patent rule may preclude a plaintiff's recovery
under a negligence theory in Maryland, it is considered as one of the Wade
factors in a strict liability action. See Banks, 59 Md. App. at 427, 475 A.2d at
1252. Additionally, the defendant's compliance with statutory standards may
be considered in a design defect case brought in strict liability. See Ellsworth v.
Sherne Lingerie, 303 Md. 581, 602, 495 A.2d 348, 358 (1985) (noting that
compliance with a statutory standard, although relevant to defectiveness, does
not preclude recovery).
245. See, e.g., Nicholson, 80 Md. App. at 720, 566 A.2d at 147 (regarding strict liabil-
ity: "[Wihether one uses the 'consumer expectation' or 'risk-utility' test, the
plaintiff has the burden of alleging and proving that the defendants acted un-
reasonably in placing the product with the patent defect into the stream of
commerce.") (emphasis addded). Apparently, this difficulty is not unique to
Maryland courts. As one California court noted, courts differ on whether the
consumer expectations test or risk-utility test should be applied to strict liabil-
ity design defect claims. See Morton v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 40 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 22, 24 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995). The court went on to recognize that even
within the same jurisdiction, a court may apply the consumer expectation test
to one type of design defect claim and the risks utility test to another type of
design defect claim. See id.
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ryland decisions in which a plaintiff has brought a design defect
claim in strict liability frequently begin their inquiry by citing the
tendency of Maryland courts to utilize the consumer expectations
test.246 As a threshold matter, however, Maryland courts must deter-
mine whether the defect created an "inherently unreasonable risk"
to the user.247 If the court answers in the affirmative, it applies the
consumer expectations test.248 Maryland's position on this matter is
in accord with the views expressed in the Restatement (Third) of the
Law of Torts: Products Liability.249
246. See Kelley, 304 Md. at 137, 497 A.2d at 1149 (citing Phipps, 278 Md. at 337, 363
A.2d at 955; Simpson, 72 Md. App. at 203-04, 527 A.2d at 1340).
247. Lundgren, 80 Md. App. at 530, 565 A.2d at 339 ("[W]e do not feel it is not the
province of the jury to decide that a particular product, which may serve an
important function in the community is inherently dangerous. Because of the
policy considerations at stake and the need for consistent application, this de-
termination is one that a jury in each individual case is ill equipped to
make."); Ellsworth, 303 Md. at 601, 495 A.2d at 358 (noting the requirement
that a plaintiff prove that a product is unreasonably dangerous); Zeigler, 74
Md. App. at 620, 539 A.2d at 704 ("[C]onsumer expectations do not provide
guidelines fully suitable to situations involving design defects, where 'the con-
sumer would not know what to expect, because he would have no idea how
safe the product could be made."-(quoting Wade, supra note 3, at 829)).
248. If the defective design is "obvious," Maryland courts do not require a balanc-
ing of factors. See Troja v. Black & Decker Mfg., 62 Md. App. 101, 108, 488
A.2d 516, 519 (1985) (noting that in cases where there is an inherently dan-
gerous product, no balancing is required); Ziegler, 74 Md. App. at 620, 539
A.2d at 705 (quoting Digges & Billmyre, supra note 8, at 52); C & K Lord, Inc.,
74 Md. App. at 89-90, 536 A.2d at 709 (holding that the failure to provide a
safety guard on a conveyor is not an inherently unreasonable risk); accord Mor-
ton, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 24. With an inherently unreasonable risk in design, the
case is analogous to a manufacturing defect case, in that the product failed to
perform as the manufacturer initially intended. See id. (quoting Digges &
Billmyre, supra note 8, at 52). Courts-have struggled to apply the consumer ex-
pectations test in claims for strict liability for design defects. See Phipps, 278
Md. at 345 n.4, 363 A.2d at 959 n.4 (noting the difficulty of applying the con-
sumer expectations test when the design conforms to the manufacturer's spec-
ifications).
249. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF ToRTS: PRODUCTS LLQILITY § 2 cmt. b
(1997). The comments to the Restatement explain this method courts employ
to bifurcate design defect claims in strict liability as follows:
Section 3 frees the plaintiff from the strictures of [proving the availa-
bility of a reasonable alternative design] in circumstances in which
common experience teaches that an inference of defect may be war-
ranted under the specific facts, including the failure of the product to
perform its manifestly intended function. When the defect established [by
way of circumstantial evidence that supports an inference of product
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When the consumer expectations test guides the court's assess-
ment of the defendant's product, state of the art evidence could be
relevant in establishing the temporal element for the fact-finder. For
example, in Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp.,2s° the court explained:
State-of-the-art evidence helps to determine the expectation
of the ordinary consumer. A consumer would not expect a
Model T to have the safety features which are incorporated
in an automobile made today. The same expectation applies
to airplanes. Plaintiffs have not shown that the ordinary
consumer would expect a plane made in 1952 to have the
safety features of one made in 1970.251
Other courts disagree, finding that state of the art evidence is
not relevant to demonstrate what a reasonable consumer would ex-
pect. 2s2 The rationale is that ordinary consumers do not build ex-
pectations based on product design information that is not gener-
ally available.253 Thus, state of the art evidence is irrelevant because
jurors have the requisite knowledge of an ordinary consumer and
can perform their fact-finding role without evidence of state of the
art designs that may have existed.2s' Thus, state of the art evidence
would not be admissible in design defect cases brought in Maryland
in which the consumer expectations test is applied.
The prerequisite to applying the consumer expectations test is
a finding that the product created an inherently unreasonable
defect] may involve product design, some courts recognize consumer
expectations as an adequate test for defect, in apparent conflict with
the reasonable alternative design requirement [which suggests a risk-
utility balancing test]. But when the claims involve a product's failure
to perform its manifestly intended function and [circumstantial evi-
dence supports an inference of product defect], the apparent con-
flict disappears.
Id.
250. 544 F.2d 442 (10th Cir. 1976).
251. Id at 447.
252. See Morton, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 25-26 (holding that in an asbestos exposure
case, state of the art evidence regarding the awareness of the scientific com-
munity as to the dangers of asbestos was irrelevant when a court applies the
consumer expectation test). However, this same court held that "[u]nder cer-
tain circumstances, expert testimony may be admissible to prove what ordinary
consumers of the product actually expect when those expectations are beyond
the lay experience common to all jurors." Id. at 26.
253. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
254. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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risk.255 Maryland cases have likened this category of cases to manu-
facturing defect cases in which the defect is established by showing
that the product failed to perform as intended. 256 For instance,
when the drive shaft of a new car separates from the body of the
car under normal driving conditions and causes a collision, no fur-
ther inquiry is required.257 State of the art evidence could not ab-
solve a defendant because "[c]onditions like these, even if resulting
from the design of the products, are defective and unreasonably
dangerous without the necessity of weighing and balancing various
factors involved."258
Conversely, when a court determines that the product did not
create an inherently unreasonable risk,29 it will apply the risk-utility
test, utilizing the Wade factors,26° to determine whether the defect is
unreasonably dangerous. 261 With increasing frequency, the risk-utility
255. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
256. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
257. See Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 345, 363 A.2d 955, 958
(1976).
258. Id. at 346, 363 A.2d at 959; accord RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF TORTS:
PRODUCTS LABiLrry § 2 cmt. b, § 3 (1997) (suggesting that it is appropriate to
apply the consumer expectations test and permit an inference of design de-
fect when circumstantial evidence demonstrates that the incident that harmed
the plaintiff was the type that normally occurs as the result of a defect).
259. Determining whether a risk is inherently unreasonable is a question for the
court, not the jury. See DEWEY ET AL, supra note 8, at 6.
260. See Banks v. Iron Hustler Corp., 59 Md. App. 408, 425, 475 A.2d 1243, 1252
(1984) (discussing Phipps, 278 Md. at 345, 363 A.2d at 955); see also Binakonsky
v. Ford Motor Co., 133 F.3d 281, 285 (4th Cir. 1998) (noting that Maryland
suggests that courts employ the seven-factor Wade analysis); Polansky v. Ryobi
of Am. Corp., 760 F. Supp. 85, 87 (1991).
261. See Binakonsky, 133 F.3d at 285; Hull v. Eaton Corp., 825 F.2d 448, 454 (D.C.
Cir. 1987); Singleton v. International Harvester Co., 685 F.2d 112, 114-15 (4th
Cir. 1981) (citing Phipps, 278 Md. at 346, 363 A.2d at 959 (holding that the
failure to incorporate an alternate rollover protective design in a tractor did
not qualify as an inherently unreasonable risk and therefore, applying the risk-
utility test); Polansky, 760 F Supp. at 87; Singleton, 727 F. Supp. at 221 (alleging
risk-utility for an alleged design defect due to a lack of mirrors to prevent
blind spots for crane); Valk Mfg. v. Rangaswamy, 74 Md. App. 304, 314, 537
A.2d 622, 627 (1988), rev'd on other grounds, 317 Md. 185, 562 A.2d 1246 (1989)
(quoting KEETON ET AL.., supra note 65, § 99, at 699); Ziegler v. Kawaski Indus.,
74 Md. App. 613, 621, 624, 539 A.2d 701, 705, 706 (1987) (applying the risk-
utility test to determine whether a motorcycle manufactured without lower ex-
tremity safety guards was unreasonably dangerous) (citing Digges & Billmyre,
supra note 8, at 52); Troja v. Black & Decker Mfg., 62 Md. App. 101, 108-09,
488 A.2d 516, 519 (1985) (holding that in a case in which the plaintiff alleged
that the manufacturer failed to incorporate a safety system for a radial arm
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test has been both discussed 262 and applied in Maryland as an alter-
native test to determine whether a product was rendered unreasona-
bly dangerous due to a defect in design. 263 However, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland has never specifically overruled the use of the
consumer expectations test in a strict liability design defect case.264
Nevertheless, Maryland's lower court decisions and federal court de-
cisions interpreting Maryland law265 indicate that scenarios in which
the risk-utility test is applicable dwarf those in which the consumer
expectations test is involved.266
saw did not pose an inherently unreasonable risk). The alternative, consumer
expectations 'test is inadequate in such a determination. See KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 65, § 99, at 698-99. Courts in other jurisdictions make similar dis-
tinctions. A product that falls outside of the inherently unreasonable risk cat-
agory of design defect may be characterized as a product that involves "com-
plicated design considerations . . . obscure components, [or] esoteric
circumstances surrounding the accident," the risk-utility test is more likely to
be applied. Morton v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 22, 24
(Cal. CL App. 1995).
262. See Phipps, 278 Md. at 346, 363 A.2d at 959; Kelley v. RLG. Indus., 304 Md. 124,
136-38, 497 A.2d 1143, 1148-49 (1985); Nicholson v. Yamaha Motor Co., 80 Md.
App. 695, 718-19, 566 A.2d 135, 147 (1989); Simpson v. Standard Container
Co., 72 Md. App. 199, 204, 527 A.2d 1337, 1340 (1987); Sheehan v. Anthony
Pools, 50 Md. App. 614, 620 n.6, 440 A.2d 1085, 1089 n.6 (1982).
263. See Klein v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 92 Md. App. 477, 485-86, 608 A.2d 1276,
1280 (1992); Lundgren v. Ferno-Washington, Co., 80 Md. App. 522, 527-28, 565
A.2d 335, 338 (1989); Zeigler, 74 Md. App. at 620, 539 A.2d at 704; Valk Mfg., 74
Md. App. at 313, 537 A.2d at 626 (noting that both the consumer expectations
and risk-utility tests are used in design defect cases); Troja, 62 Md. App. at 107-
09, 488 A.2d at 519; DEWEY ET AL. supra note 8, at 4.
264. See Kelley, 304 Md. at 137, 497 A.2d at 1149 (discussing both the consumer ex-
pectations and risk-utility test and finding that neither applied because a de-
fect necessary for either analysis was not present); Phipps, 278 Md. at 348, 363
A.2d at 955 (discussing both the tests and applying the consumer expectations
test).
265. See Binakonsky, 133 F.3d at 285 (applying the risk-utility test under Maryland
law); Doe v. Miles Lab., Inc., 927 F.2d 187, 191 (4th Cir. 1991) (applying the
risk-utility test under Maryland law); Hull, 825 F.2d at 453-55 (finding that
based on the Phipps decision, Maryland law requires adherence to the risk-
utility test in a strict liability design defect case); Johnson v. International Har-
vester Co., 702 F.2d 492, 494-95 (4th Cir. 1983) (applying the risk-utility test
under Maryland law); Singleton, 685 F.2d at 115 (citing Phipps, 278 Md. at 337,
363 A.2d at 955 for approval of the risk-utility test under Maryland law); Rock
v. Oyster Corp., 810 F. Supp. 665, 666-67 (D. Md. 1991) (applying the risk-
utility test under Maryland law); Polansky, 760 F. Supp. at 87 (applying the risk-
utility test under Maryland law).
266. See DEWEY ET AL., supra note 8, at 4.
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With the risk-utility test comes the series of Wade factors that
must be weighed and considered to determine whether a product is
unreasonably dangerous. 267 In those jurisdictions permitting use of
state of the art in strict liability design defect cases,268 a plaintiff can
use state of the art evidence to demonstrate any unreasonable dan-
gers posed by the manufacturer's design. 269 If Maryland chooses to
adopt section 2 of the Restatement (Third) of the Law of Torts: Products
Liability, a plaintiff alleging a defective design in a product that did
not create inherently unreasonable risks will be required to prove
the availability of a reasonable alternative design.270 As Maryland law
presently stands, if a plaintiff asserts that a reasonable alternative
design to the defendant's product existed, 27' the plaintiff must offer
proof of at least one of the Wade factors to create a jury question.272
267. See supra note 74 for a discussion of section 402A and the Wade factors.
268. But see supra notes 206-12 and accompanying text. These jurisdictions reason
that "because the manufacturer's standard of care is irrelevant [under RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(2) (a)], state of the art evidence should
be excluded because such evidence relates solely to the reasonableness of the
manufacturer's design choice." Robb, supra note 3, at 12. These courts con-
clude that state of the art evidence in design defect cases based on strict liabil-
ity inject negligence principles into strict liability. See id. at 14-15. Yet, while
strict liability imputes knowledge of the defect on the manufacturer, it does
not impute knowledge of a cure; therefore, in this regard, state of the art evi-
dence is relevant under a strict liability theory. See Ellen Wertheimer, Unknow-
able Dangers and the Death of Strict Products Liability: The Empire Strikes Back, 60 U.
CIN. L. REv. 1183, 1210-11 (1992).
269. See Robb, supra note 3, at 10-11 (noting the relevance of the state of the art to
the reasonableness of the manufacturer's design); Birnbaum & Wrubel, supra
note 1, at 30.
270. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF TORTS: PRODUCrS LIABILITY § 2 &
cmt. b (1997).
271. See Binakonsky v. Ford Motor Co., 133 F3d 281, 285-89 (4th Cir. 1998) (apply-
ing the risk-utility test to an allegation that the defendants' plastic fuel lines
and connectors were defective because they were not designed to withstand
extreme heat and pressure); Nicholson v. Yamaha Motor Co., 80 Md. App.
695, 717, 566 A.2d 135, 146 (1989) (noting that Maryland courts generally use
both the issues of unreasonable dangerousness and defect); Lundgren v.
Ferno-Washington Co., 80 Md. App. 522, 527, 565 A.2d 335, 338 (1989) (apply-
ing the risk-utility test to determine whether the defendant's design of a cart
that transported photocopiers was unreasonably dangerous due to a design
defect in light of the plaintiff's proposed alternative design).
272. See Nicholson, 80 Md. App. at 718-19, 566 A.2d at 147 ("There is nothing in the
amended complaint to indicate that it would be cost-effective or commercially
feasible to incorporate [the plaintiffs' proposed] modifications into the de-
sign, that any other manufacturer has done so, or that any other modifica-
tions would make the vehicle a safer product."); Troja v. Black & Decker Mfg.,
[Vol. 28
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When a reasonable alternative design is proposed, the plaintiff
will generally introduce evidence of the state of the art at the time
of the product's design.273 This evidence is directly related to the
fourth factor of the Wade analysis 274 -" [t] he manufacturer's ability
to eliminate the unsafe character of the product without impairing
its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain its utility."275
State of the art evidence is relevant to demonstrate the economic
desirability of the alternative design, whether similarly situated man-
ufacturers employed the alternative design, and the practicability of
an alternative design.276 To demonstrate that a reasonable alterna-
62 Md. App. 101, 109, 488 A.2d 516, 520 (1985) (noting that to recover, a
plaintiff must demonstrate some evidence of unreasonableness as determined
by the Wade factors).
273. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 65, § 99, at 701 (citing Caterpillar Tractor v.
Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979); Anderson v. Herron Eng'g Co., 604 P.2d 674
(Colo. 1979); Olson v. A.W. Chesterton, 256 N.W.2d 530 (N.D. 1977)); Sobota,
supra note 19, at 950 (noting that most courts agree that the state of the art
should be measured from the time of design). See generaly 3 FRUMER & FRIED-
mN, supra note 3, § 18.03[2], at 18-63 to 18-66 (discussing O'Brien v. Muskin
Corp., 463 A.2d 298 (N.J. 1983); Boatland of Houston, Inc. v. Bailey, 609
S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980)).
274. See Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 345 n.4, 363 A.2d 955, 959
n.4 (1976) (listing the fourth Wade factor as "the ability to eliminate danger
without seriously impairing the usefulness of the product"); Zeigler v. Kawa-
saki Indus., 74 Md. App. 613, 625, 539 A.2d 701, 707 (1987) (noting the plain-
tiff's failure to present evidence regarding alternative designs and products);
Valk Mfg. v. Rangaswamy, 74 Md. App. 304, 316-17, 537 A.2d 622, 628 (1988),
rev'd, 317 Md. 185, 562 A.2d 1246 (1989) (noting with approval the trial court's
admission of expert testimony regarding an alternative design of a snow plow
hitch, but indicating that the proposal feature was common in the trade); 3
FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, § 18.0312], at 18-63 to 18-64 (discussing
Boatland of Houston, Inc., 609 S.W.2d at 746). If the evidence, whether expert
or state of the art, fails to demonstrate that an alternative design would de-
crease the risk of harm, the defendant will be entitled to judgment as a mat-
ter of law. See Zeigler, 74 Md. App. at 627, 539 A.2d at 708 (upholding the trial
court's grant of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict because the plaintiff's
expert testimony failed to satisfy the risk prong of the risk-utility test). See gen-
erally 3 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, § 18.03[2], at 18-63 to 18-64 (discuss-
ing Boatland of Houston, Inc., 609 S.W.2d 743 (explaining the significance of
state of the art evidence in determining reasonable alternative designs)).
275. See Wade, supra note 74, at 17.
276. See PRODUcTS LIABILrrY PRAcTIcE GUIDE, supra note 28, § 15.08[6], at 15-128; 1
MADDEN. supra note 36. § 12.13 at 528. Economic desirability factors would in-
clude the economic market for the alternatively designed products and any ef-
fects on the product's price. See PRODUCTS LIABILITY PRACTICE GUIDE, supra
note 28, § 15.08[6], at 15-128.
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tive design existed, plaintiffs often elicit testimony that supports
their proposed product design change. 277 As with any expert evi-
dence, testimony about a reasonable alternative design will not be
admissible if it is merely an unsubstantiated opinion. 278 Often, direct
evidence of the state of the art in the particular product line will be
used to supplement the testimony of an expert, and in certain sce-
narios, the court will require such evidence. 279 Maryland courts are
likely to find these use of state of the art evidence both relevant
and persuasive. 2s°
277. See 2 PRODUCTS LIABILIY PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 28, § 15.05[5], at 15-123
to 15-124. However, a mariufacturer should not rely too heavily on expert wit-
nesses, especially in design defect cases, because "[f] rom a jury's standpoint, it
is far more persuasive to learn about the practical effects of an alternative de-
sign from a witness who has 'hands-on' experience with the product and is in-
timately familiar with its uses, applications, and limitations in the 'real world.'"
See id. at 15-124.
278. See Troja v. Black & Decker Mfg., 62 Md. App. 101, 110, 488 A.2d 516, 520
(1985) (affirming a trial judge's exclusion of unsubstantiated expert testimony
regarding an alternative safety lock design, characterizing it as a "bald state-
ment"); Singleton v. International Harvester Co., 685 F.2d 112, 115 (4th Cir.
1981) (noting the plaintiff's paucity of evidence regarding an alternative de-
sign). See generally MD. R EvID. 5-702 (permitting a trial judge to consider the
factual support for an expert's conclusion in determining admissibility).
279. See Troja, 62 Md. App. at 110, 488 A.2d at 520. In its discussion of the expert
testimony put forth by the plaintiff, the Troja court seemed to look for more
concrete evidence, such as the state of the art of the radial saw industry when
it declared: "The total absence of any information caused [the expert's] testi-
mony regarding the alleged feasibility of an alternative design to be a mere
proposal, unsupported by evidence." See id. at 110, 488 A.2d at 520.
280. See Singleton, 685 F.2d at 115-16 (affirming the trial court's directed verdict in a
defective design strict liability case due in part to the lack of evidence
presented by the plaintiff regarding the practical, technical, and economic
feasibility of incorporating an alternative design); see also 3 FRUMER & FRIED-
MAN, supra note 3, § 18.03[4], at 18-63 to 18-64 (noting the importance of "sci-
entific knowledge, economic feasibility, and the practicalities of implement-
ing" an alternative design in a strict liability context) (quoting Boatland of
Houston, Inc., 609 S.W.2d at 748). Although the court of special appeals ques-
tioned the relevance of state of the art evidence in Banks v. Iron Hustler Coip.,
subsequent decisions applying Maryland law narrow the court's rejection to ev-
idence of industry standards. See Banks v. Iron Hustler Corp., 59 Md. App.
408, 427-28, 475 A.2d 1243, 1252 (1984) (responding to the trial court's con-
clusion that the plaintiff's expert did not know or indicate the state of the art
by commenting, "Thus, although the issue of a manufacturer's compliance
with industry standards may be relevant to a claim based on negligence, it is
'generally considered to be irrelevant in a strict liability case'" (quoting
Rexrode v. American Laundry Press Co., 674 F.2d 826 (10th Cir. 1982)). Nota-
State of the Art Evidence in Products Liability
While state of the art evidence does not control a court's deter-
mination of a manufacturer's liability,28' alternative designs pro-
posed by a plaintiff may be no more than unpersuasive suggestions
absent state of the art evidence.212 However, a plaintiff must utilize
state of the art evidence carefully because presenting this evidence
"opens the door" to rebuttal evidence presented by the defend-
ant.283 The defendant may offer state of the art evidence to demon-
strate that a safer product was not feasible.284 Often, the defendant's
rebuttal evidence will relate to the second Wade factor, which con-
cerns the dangers of the product.285 In this sense, the defendant's
state of the art evidence may indicate that the plaintiff's proposed
design would result in a product that posed different and poten-
tially greater risks than the risks that existed in the manufacturer's
original design.28 6
Commentators argue that there is no distinction between negli-
gence and strict liability when a court applies the risk-utility test as
the test is employed by courts to determine whether a manufacturer
'"acted reasonably in putting it[s product] on the market." 2' 7 Under
this formulation, many jurisdictions will admit a manufacturer's
state of the art evidence even when the plaintiff does not seek to
admit state of the art evidence. 28 The most compelling argument
that supports admitting a defendant's state of the art evidence is
that if a manufacturer is not permitted to demonstrate that its prod-
uct was crafted with state of the art safety features the manufacturer
would be absolutely liable. 289 A majority of jurisdictions, including
Maryland, 290 have refused to hold manufacturers absolutely liable. 29
1
bly, the Singleton court seemed to approve of a court's admission of industry
standards in assessing the feasibility of the plaintiff's alternative design. See Sin-
gleton, 685 F.2d at 116.
281. See Madden, supra note 14, at 276.
282. See PRODUCrS LIABILrry PRAcTICE GuIDE, supra note 28, 15.08[6], at 15-129.
283. See 3 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, § 18.03[4], at 18-63 to 18-64.
284. Id.
285. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
286. See PRODUCrS LIABILITY PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 28, 15.08[6], at 15-128.
287. Klein v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 92 Md. App. 477, 486, 608 A.2d 1276, 1280
(1992) (quoting Ziegler v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., 74 Md. App. 613, 621, 539
A.2d 701, 705 (quoting Singleton v. International Harvester Co., 685 F.2d 112,
115 (4th Cir. 1981))).
288. See supra notes 309-23 and accompanying text.
289. See Robb, supra note 3, at 30.
290. See Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 351-52, 363 A.2d 955, 963
(1976) (refusing to hold a manufacturer as an insurer of its product).
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Much of the same reasoning applies to strict liability claims based
on inadequate warnings. However, unlike strict liability design de-
fect claims, Maryland courts have had ample opportunity to rule on
state of the art evidence in inadequate warning cases.
C. Failure to Warn
It is well settled in American jurisprudence that a seller 292 of a
product has an obligation to warn a purchaser, user, or consumer
of the nature of the product and any dangers involved in its use,
consumption or application. 293 Section 402A of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts subjects a seller of "any product in a defective condi-
tion unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer" to strict lia-
bility.294 In a failure to warn case based upon strict liability, the lack
of an adequate warning 295 may render the product defective296 and
291. See Robb, supra note 3, at 8-9 nn.27-28.
292. For a discussion of how certain sections of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS only apply to manufacturers and non-manufacturing suppliers, see infra
note 375.
293. See 5 SPEISER ET AL., supra note 1, at 967.
294. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). Section 402A reads:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to li-
ability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or con-
sumer, or to his property, if (a) the seller is engaged in the business
of selling such a product, and (b) it is expected to and does reach
the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in
which it is sold. 2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product, and (b) the user or consumer has not bought
the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the
seller.
Id.
295. If a manufacturer has a duty to warn, strict liability may be imposed in two sit-
uations: (1) where there is a complete failure to warn, or (2) where an inade-
quate warning is given. See, e.g., Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 426
(2d Cir. 1969) (noting that there is no strict liability unless the consumer es-
tablishes a breach of the manufacturer's duty to warn). A warning may be
deemed inadequate if it does not "catch the eye," Madden, supra note 14, at
311, if it does not warn that a certain injury could occur, see Ferebee v. Chev-
ron Chem. Co., 552 F Supp. 1293, 1304 (D. D.C. 1982) (applying Maryland
law), or if the warning does not indicate what adverse effects could transpire
should the warning's instructions go unheeded. See id. at 1305. In addition,
supplying instructions will not satisfy the manufacturer's duty to warn if the
consumer is not alerted to latent dangers in the product. See Meisner v. Patton
Elec. Co., 781 F. Supp. 1432, 1439 (D. Neb. 1990) (finding that the manufac-
turer of a space heater that instructed consumers not to use an extension
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unreasonably dangerous.2 97 A manufacturer has a duty to warn when
it knows, or should know, of a danger inherent in the use of its
product. 298 However, a duty to warn under strict liability does not
arise where the product's dangerous propensity is either obvious299
or unforeseeable. 3 ° Ostensibly, the element of foreseeability is as
important to the analysis under strict liability as it is in
negligence. 30'
The major limitation placed on a manufacturer's duty to warn
exists in comment j to section 402A. 302 Comment j states that the
seller is only required to give warning "if he has knowledge, or by
the application of reasonable, developed human skill and foresight
should have knowledge" of the product's dangerous propensity. 30 3
cord with its product had failed to adequately warn consumers of the poten-
tial danger of its product).
296. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
297. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. h,j (1965). Where a plaintiff
alleges failure to warn based on strict liability theory, the issue or appropriate
inquiry determines "whether the lack of a proper warning made the product
unreasonably dangerous." DEWEY ET AL, supra note 8, at 6 (citing Werner v.
Upjohn Co., 682 E2d 848, 858 (4th Cir. 1980)).
298. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. j (1965). Accordingly, under
strict liability, a manufacturer may be imputed with constructive knowledge of
the danger inherent in the use of its product. See Madden, supra note 14, at
243.
299. See, e.g., Bookout v. Victor Comptometer Corp., 576 P.2d 197, 198 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1978) ("[T]he potential for danger inherent in a BB gun is readily ap-
parent and a warning for the obvious is not a requirement of the doctrine of
products liability.").
300. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmts. h, j (1965).
301. See id.; see also Madden, supra note 14, at 242-43.
302. See Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 437, 601 A.2d 633, 641 (1992)
(holding that commentj of section 402A is applicable to a strict liability cause
of action when the alleged defect is a failure to warn).
303. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. j (1965). Comment j, in perti-
nent part, reads:
Directions or warning. In order to prevent the product from being un-
reasonably dangerous, the seller may be required to give directions
or warning, on the container, as to its use. The seller may reasonably
assume that those with common allergies, as for example to eggs or
strawberries, will be aware of them, and he is not required to warn
against them. Where, however, the product contains an ingredient to
which a substantial number of the population are allergic, and the
ingredient is one whose danger is not generally known, or if known
is one which the consumer would reasonably not expect to find in
the product, the seller is required to give warning against it, if he has
knowledge, or by the application of reasonable, developed human
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Thus, comment j emphasizes that section 402A does not relegate
the seller to the position of an insurer.304 Rather, by incorporating a
knowledge component, comment j essentially injects negligence
principles into strict liability.
3 0 5
Many courts and commentators have expressed the opinion
that, as with design defect claims, inadequate warning claims
brought in strict liability and negligence are indistinguishable.
3°6
skill and foresight should have knowledge, of the presence of the in-
gredient and the danger. Likewise in the case of poisonous drugs, or
those unduly dangerous for other reasons, warning as to use may be
required.
Id.; see also Zeobia, 325 Md. at 437, 601 A.2d at 641 (holding that "for pur-
poses of the 'should have knowledge' component of comment j, a manufac-
turer of a product is held to the knowledge of an expert in the field"). This is
especially important for a manufacturer's failure to warn because "it would
seem to be extending strict liability too far to require a manufacturer to bear
the costs of accidents to a few who were victimized by an unknowable risk of a
good product that was a boon to humanity-such as when penicillin was first
marketed." KEETON ET AL, supra note 65, § 99, at 698. While section 402A pro-
vides a form of recovery under strict liability for inadequate warnings, at least
one commentator likens this cause of action to negligence because the plain-
tiff must demonstrate that the defendant knew or should have known about
the dangers posed by the product and failed to fulfill its duty to warn. See id.
at 697.
304. See Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 782 F.2d 1156, 1164 (4th Cir. 1986)
(stating that despite the use of the term "strict liability," the seller is not an
insurer); Zenobia, 325 Md. at 437, 601 A.2d at 641 (citing Lohrmann for the
proposition that "the seller is not an insurer"); Phipps v. General Motors
Corp., 278 Md. 337, 351-52, 363 A.2d 955, 963 (1976) (finding that despite the
term "strict liability," the seller is not an insurer, as absolute liability is not im-
posed on the seller for all injuries resulting from his product); see also Oakes
v. Geigy Agric. Chem., 77 Cal. Rptr. 709, 713 (Cal. CL. App. 1969) (stating that
to "exact an obligation to warn the user of unknown and unknowable aller-
gies... would be for the courts to recast the manufacturer in the role of the
insurer"); Woodill v. Parke-Davis & Co., 402 N.E.2d 194, 199 (11. 1980) (stating
that to hold a manufacturer liable for failure to warn of a danger that is im-
possible to be aware of would make him the virtual insurer of the product);
Ortho Pharm. Co. v. Chapman, 388 N.E.2d 541, 548 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979) (re-
jecting the obligation of a manufacturer to warn of all allergies to a product).
305. See Zmobia, 325 Md. at 435, 601 A.2d at 640.
306. See Gauthier v. AMF, Inc., 788 F.2d 634, 637 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding no practi-
cal difference between strict liability and negligence in defective design cases);
Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 467 (7th Cir. 1984) (stating that
there is no difference between strict liability and negligence in defective de-
sign cases); Gordon v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, 574 F.2d 1182, 1190 (5th
Cir. 1978) (stating that negligent failure to warn triggers strict liability and ul-
timately a breach of duty); see also Henderson & Twerski, supra note 155, at
[Vol. 28
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Thus, these two doctrines of liability are often confused and used si-
multaneously in failure to warn cases. 307 Deans Keeton and Wade,
for example, previously argued that under section 402A's theory of
strict liability, a manufacturer should be held liable regardless of
the defendant's knowledge of the product's danger.3°8 Several courts
have adopted this reasoning and held that state of the art evidence,
which operates to prove or disprove the knowledge component, is
inadmissible. In Kisor v. Johns-Manville Corp.,3°9 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed a strict liability
claim arising from a manufacturer's alleged failure to warn. Apply-
ing Washington law, the court determined that the sole issue was
whether the manufacturer's warning was sufficiently conspicuous so
as to inform consumers of the product's dangerous nature and what
measures a customer could have employed to avoid those dan-
gers. 310 According to the court, "[t]he focus is on the warning itself
and the reasonable expectations of the consumer, not upon the
manufacturer's conduct." 32 ' Therefore, the court refused to allow
the manufacturer to admit expert testimony concerning the medical
and industry knowledge concerning the hazards of exposure to
asbestos. 312
278 (rejecting semantic differences between negligent failure to warn and
strict liability failure to warn).
307. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 155, at 270.
308. See Keeton, supra note 3, at 407-08; Wade, supra note 3, at 834-35; accord Kisor
v. Johns-Manville Corp., 783 F.2d 1337, 1341 (9th Cir. 1986) (applying Wash-
ington law that compliance with industry standards is not relevant in strict lia-
bility actions); Elmore v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 673 S.W.2d 434, 438 (Mo. 1984)
(holding that state of the art evidence has no bearing on the outcome of a
strict liability claim in Missouri); Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 447
A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982) (holding that a product may be unsafe under New Jersey
law regardless of industry knowledge). Jurisdictions forbidding the use of state
of the art evidence reason that to recover "the plaintiff only has to show that
the seller is engaged in the business of selling the product, that the product
contains a defect, and that the defect caused the injury. Therefore, whether
the seller knew or reasonably should have known of the dangers inherent in
its product is irrelevant." Johnson v. Raybestos-Manhattan, 740 P.2d 548, 549
(Haw. 1987). See general!y I FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, § 8.04[6], at 8-
205 to 8-206 (discussing this perspective and the trend toward admitting state
of the art evidence in strict liability actions).
309. 783 F.2d 1337 (9th Cir. 1986) (applying Washington law that compliance with
industry standards is irrelevant in strict liability action).
310. See id. at 1341 (quoting Little v. PPG Indus., 594 P.2d 911, 914 (Wash. 1979)).
311. Id.
312. See id.
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In Johnson v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc.,3" 3 the Supreme Court of
Hawaii addressed the admissibility of state of the art evidence, in a
strict liability claim, to establish whether a manufacturer knew or
should have known about the danger inherent in its product.3 4 The
court found that because negligence was irrelevant to a strict liabil-
ity claim, the manufacturer's knowledge was equally irrelevant.3t5 As
a result, the court held state of the art evidence was not admissible
for the purpose of establishing a manufacturer's knowledge of the
inherent dangerousness of his product.3 6 Although the Johnson
court did not directly address the admissibility of state of the art evi-
dence in strict liability cases arising from a manufacturer's failure to
warn, 317 subsequent courts applying Hawaii law extended its holding
to failure to warn cases.318
However, both Deans Keeton and Wade have since repudiated
their view that knowledge of a product's danger is irrelevant when
determining the defectiveness of a product based on failure to
warn. 319 This shifting of opinions on the relevance of a manufac-
turer's knowledge illustrates the confusion and changing application
of negligence and strict liability. The principles contained in section
402A and comment j appear contradictory, leading several courts to
conclude that comment j is an exception to the general proposition
set forth in section 402A.320
313. 740 P.2d 548 (Haw. 1987) (addressing issues certified to the court by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit).
314. See id. at 549. The first issue certified was whether a manufacturer was conclu-
sively presumed to have knowledge of the inherent danger of its product. See
id.
315. See id. The court framed the relevant inquiry for determining "dangerously
defective" in terms of reasonable consumer expectations. Id.
316. See id. The court was quick to note that whether state of the art evidence
could be probative of another element of strict liability was not addressed
here. See id. at 549 n.3.
317. See id. at 549 n.2.
318. See In 7v Hawaii Fed. Asbestos Cases, 960 F.2d 806, 815-16 (9th Cir. 1992); In re
Hawaii Fed. Asbestos Cases, 699 F. Supp. 233, 235-37 (D. Haw. 1988).
319. SeeJohn W. Wade, On the Effect in Product Liability of Knowledge Unavailable Prior
to Marketing, Postscript, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 734, 761-64 (1983) (finding that strict
liability involves the consideration of the defendant's knowledge); W. Page
Keeton, The Meaning of Defect in Products Liability La--A Review of Basic Princi-
ples, 45 Mo. L. REv. 579, 586-87 (1980) (stating that in failure to warn cases, a
plaintiff must show that the defendant knew or should have known of the risk
of which he failed to warn).
320. See Owens-Illinois v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 433, 601 A.2d 633, 639 (1992)
(cited Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 402 N.E.2d 194, 200 (11. 1980); Little v.
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The vast majority of courts321 and legislatures322 have concluded
that a manufacturer of a product that is defective, because it lacks
an adequate warning, cannot be found liable when the failure to
warn results from a lack of knowledge of the product's dangerous
nature. In order to prove the knowledge element of comment j,
courts have stated that the requisite knowledge can be shown by
state of the art evidence. 32 3 Maryland eventually adopted the major-
ity view and presently admits state of the art evidence in strict liabil-
ity actions premised upon a failure to warn.
324
In Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co.,325 the United States District
PPG Indus., 579 P.2d 940, 946-47 (Wash. 1978),modified on other grounds, 594
P.2d 911 (Wash. 1979)).
321. Id. at 433, 601 A.2d at 639; see also Outlaw v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 770
F.2d 1012, 1014 (11 th Cir. 1985) (applying Alabama law and holding that when
plaintiff was injured by a tire that exploded, plaintiff was required to prove
that the seller was aware of the risk and thus, should have warned plaintiff);
Robinson v. Audi Nsu Auto Union Aktiengesellschaft, 739 F.2d 1481, 1488
(10th Cir. 1984) (applying Oklahoma law and stating that prior knowledge of
a defect is "germane as to whether the product as sold was unreasonably dan-
gerous to the user," and that evidence of such prior knowledge is admissible
in a products liability action) (citing McGrath v. Wallace Murray Corp., 496
F.2d 299, 304 (10th Cir. 1974)); Kehm v. Procter & Gamble Mfg., 724 F.2d 613,
620 (8th Cir. 1983) (applying Iowa law and holding that a manufacturer of
tampons was liable for damages due to death of a person who suffered toxic
shock syndrome, even if manufacturer knew only a few persons would be
harmed by product); Zepik v. Ceeco Pool & Supply, Inc., 637 F. Supp. 444,
449-50 (N.D. Ind. 1986) (applying Indiana law and holding that manufacturer
of component parts of a completed product was not liable to plaintiff who in-
jured himself while diving into a pool because the component parts were not
dangerous for the use for which they were supplied, and thus there was no
duty to warn).
322. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 155, at 268 n.13 (listing states that have
adopted "state of the art" statutes).
323. See Zenobia, 325 Md. at 436-37, 601 A.2d at 640-41.
324. See Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 782 F.2d 1156, 1164 (4th Cir.
1986). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit stated that
in Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976), the Court
of Appeals of Maryland adopted RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS section
402A (1965), that comment j is part of section 402A, see id. at 1164-65, and
that "comment j is state-of-the-art language because it requires the seller to
give a warning if he has, 'or by the application of reasonable, developed
human skill and foresight should have knowledge' of the danger." Id. at 1165
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 402A cmt. j (1965)); see also Ze-
nobia, 325 Md. at 437, 601 A.2d at 641 (holding that comment j is applicable
in strict liability duty to warn cases).
325. 552 F. Supp. 1293 (D. D.C. 1982).
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Court for the District of Columbia, applying Maryland law, ad-
dressed a strict liability claim arising from a distributor's failure to
warn.326 The plaintiff brought suit after contracting long-term pul-
monary fibrosis, alleging that his condition resulted from use of the
defendant's product, paraquat.327 The court found that the distribu-
tor was aware that lung disease could be caused by skin exposure to
paraquat.328 Even though the distributor was not specifically aware
that exposure to paraquat could cause long-term pulmonary fibro-
sis, the court charged the distributor with a duty to warn of "serious
lung damage." 32 9 The court reasoned that, "[t]his is not a situation
in which the defendant is being charged with notice of an unfore-
seeable and drastically different type of illness,"330 in that pulmonary
fibrosis is an ailment qualifying as serious lung disease.33'
Subsequent to Phipps's embrace of section 402A,332 two cases
sought to address what degree of knowledge would be required in a
strict liability failure to warn action. In Troja v. Black & Decker Manu-
facturing Co., 333 the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland indicated a
willingness to look at state of the art evidence, but the plaintiff
failed to put forth the necessary evidence.33
In Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 335 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit interpreted Phipps to allow
state of the art evidence to be considered where the alleged defect
was a failure to warn. 336 The Fourth Circuit, applying Maryland law,
addressed a strict liability claim allegedly arising from the manufac-
326. See id. at 1297-1300 (explaining that the proximate cause requirement does
not rest entirely on whether plaintiff read a warning since the product was
provided to him by his employer and his principal source of information was
oral instructions).
327. See id. at 1299.
328. See id. at 1294-97.
329. Id. at 1300.
330. Id.
331. See id.
332. For a discussion of Phipps, see supra notes 194-205 and accompanying text.
333. 62 Md. App. 101, 105, 488 A.2d 516, 518 (1985) (alleging that the manufac-
turer's failure to include a safeguard and/or failure to warn consumers ren-
dered the product defective and unreasonably dangerous).
334. See id. at 112, 488 A.2d at 521.
335. .782 F.2d 1156, 1164 (4th Cir. 1986) (finding that the charge to the jury was
reasonable in that they were advised by the district court to measure defend-
ant's conduct in light of the scientific and medical knowledge existing at the
time the product was manufactured).
336. See id. at 1164.
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turers' failure to warn. 337 The court correctly concluded that the'
Court of Appeals of Maryland had adopted section 402A of the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts in Phipps.338 Noting that comment j is part
of section 402A339 and that comment j "requires the seller to give a
warning if he has knowledge, or by the application of reasonable,
developed human skill and foresight he should have knowledge of
the danger,"3 the court operated under the assumption that Mary-
land courts would apply comment j. The Court of Appeals of Mary-
land proved this assumption to be correct some six years later.
In Owens-Illinois v. Zenobia,341 the court of appeals addressed a
strict liability claim arising from the alleged failures to warn of sev-
eral asbestos manufacturers and suppliers. Examining section
402A,342 a prior Maryland case dealing with an inadequate warning
claim grounded in negligence, 343 case law from other jurisdictions, s3
and the Lohrmann court's reasoning, 345 the Zenobia court concluded
that state of the art evidence was admissible to demonstrate the de-
fendants' knowledge at the time of manufacture, sale, or installa-
tion.346 The court also indicated that a plaintiff would use knowl-
edge or state of the art to prove the defective condition, rejecting
the use of state of the art evidence as an affirmative defense 47
In Zenobia, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that com-
ment j is applicable in a failure to warn strict products liability
337. See id. at 1162 (holding there was insufficient evidence to show causation be-
tween the manufacturer's asbestos-containing products and the plaintiff's
claim of asbestosis).
338. See id. at 1164 (discussing Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 352-
53, 363 A.2d 955, 963 (1976) (holding that defendant manufacturing and plac-
ing an automobile on the market in a defective condition which renders the
automobile not reasonably safe, is liable for injuries caused by reason of that
defective condition)).
339. See id. at 1164-65.
340. Id. at 1165 (quoting RESrATEN (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965)).
341. 325 Md. 420, 601 A.2d 633 (1992).
342. See id. at 432-37, 601 A.2d at 638-41.
343. See Eagle-Picher Indus. v. Balbos, 84 Md. App. 10, 55, 578 A.2d 228, 250 (1990)
(holding that state of the art knowledge was admissible in a negligence failure
to warn case), affd in part and rev'd in part, 326 Md. 179, 604 A.2d 445 (1992).
344. See Zenobia, 325 Md. at 433-34, 601 A.2d at 639-40.
345. See id. at 434-37, 601 A.2d at 639-41 (permitting the admission of scientific,
medical knowledge).
346. See id. at 436-38, 601 A.2d at 641; see also Singleton v. International Harvester
Co., 685 F.2d 112, 115 (4th Cir. 1981) (noting that technological feasibility is
determined from the time of manufacture).
347. See Zenobia, 325 Md. at 438 n.8, 601 A.2d at 641 n.8.
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cause of action.34 Therefore, a manufacturer is not liable unless it
knows or should have known of the dangers that its product
poses. 349 As in negligence cases, the manufacturer is held to the
knowledge of an expert in the manufacturer's respective field. 30
Notably, the Zenobia court declared that litigants may use state
of the art evidence to establish what was known or should have
been known by manufacturers, suppliers and installers.35' The court
explained that state of the art evidence encompasses all available in-
formation pertinent to a given product.3 2 Necessarily, state of the
art includes what other manufacturers know.353 The court noted that
there exists contrary case law on whether the state of the art com-
ponent is a necessary element of the plaintiffs case or is an affirma-
tive defense.354 The court concluded, albeit in dictum, that state of
the art is an element of the plaintiff's case in a strict liability failure
to warn case.355 While Zenobia may have created more certainty as to
the admissibility of state of the art evidence, confusion over the sub-
stance of this body of evidence persists.
United States Gypsum Co. v. Mayor of Baltimore3 56 provides an ex-
cellent example of the continued confusion regarding what state of
the art evidence encompasses under an inadequate warning claim.
348. See id. at 437, 601 A.2d at 641.
349. See id.
350. See id. Additionally, a manufacturer has a duty to issue post-sale warnings. See
id. at 447, 601 A.2d at 646. This duty does not cease when the manufacturer
no longer makes the defective product. See id. at 448, 601 A.2d at 647 (discuss-
ing factors for consideration when determining whether a manufacturer has
satisfactorily discharged its post-sale duty to warn) (citing Victor E. Schwartz,
The Post-Sale Duty to Warn: Two Unfortunate Forks in the Road to a Reasonable Doc-
trine, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 892, 896 (1983)). Furthermore, intermediate sellers
such as suppliers and installers are held to the same standard as a manufac-
turer. See id. at 442-43, 601 A.2d at 644 (citing Eaton Corp. v. Wright, 281 Md.
82, 88-90, 375 A.2d 1122, 1126-27 (1977); RESTATEME.JT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
402A cmt. j (1965)).
351. See id. at 433-37, 601 A.2d at 639-41.
352. See id. at 434, 601 A.2d at 639 (quoting Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Corning
Corp., 782 F.2d 1156, 1164 (4th Cir. 1986)).
353. See id. at 444, 601 A.2d at 644; see also Dartez v. Fibreboard Corp, 765 F.2d 456,
461 (5th Cir. 1985) ("[Mlanufacturers each bear the duty to fully test their
products to uncover all scientifically discoverable dangers before the products
are sold .... The actual knowledge of an individual manufacturer is not the
issue.").
354. See Zenobia, 325 Md. at 438 n.8, 601 A.2d at 641 n.8.
355. See id.
356. 336 Md. 145, 647 A.2d 405 (1994).
[Vol. 28
State of the Art Evidence in Products Liability
In Gypsum, the trial court indicated that the knowledge component
that supports admitting state of the art evidence in a strict liability
suit is narrower than in a negligence suit.357 For the strict liability
count, the jury was instructed that a manufacturer "is held responsi-
ble for knowing what was generally known in the scientific or ex-
pert community about the product's hazards."358 The instruction was
further refined to provide that state of the art is "not what one doc-
tor or even a group of doctors suspected at that time, but what the
generally accepted view of the medical and scientific community was
at the time that their products were sold." 359 The court of appeals
held that this instruction was acceptable for both strict liability and
negligence claims based on inadequate warning.36
For the negligence count, the trial court's instruction permitted
the jury to attribute the knowledge of one manufacturer to an-
other.3' The court of appeals approved of this instruction, empha-
sizing that actual knowledge is not required; the standard is broad
enough to encompass "any other knowledge available" 362 when the
products were manufactured or sold. 363 This broad definition per-
mitted the jury to consider another corporation's internal docu-
ments and impute such knowledge on the defendant at trial. 364 Al-
though not explicit, it appears as though this expansive view of the
knowledge component would be acceptable in the strict liability
context as well 65
The above analysis demonstrates that in certain situations the
issue of admitting state of the art evidence will be resolved under
357. See id. at 165, 647 A.2d at 414. The defendant charged that the trial court's in-
structions were erroneous because "[i] n the negligence context, the Court de-
scribed 'state of the art' to include . . . attribution of knowledge from one
manufacturer to the other, but that state of the art in the strict liability con-
text was given a much narrower definition." Id. (quoting Asbestospray's brief
at 41-2) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The court replied: "Despite the
fact that the two instructions were worded differently, we perceive no inconsis-
tency and no confusion." Id.
358. Id. at 165, 647 A.2d at 415-16 (citing Zenobia, 325 Md. at 420, 601 A.2d at
633).
359. Id. at 164, 647 A.2d at 414 (approving a jury instruction to this effect).
360. See id. at 165, 647 A.2d at 414-15.
361. See id. at 165, 647 A.2d at 414.
362. Id. at 168, 647 A.2d at 416.
363. See id. at 166, 647 A.2d at 415.
364. See id. at 167-68, 647 A.2d at 416.
365. See id. at 168, 647 A.2d at 414 (holding that the non-defendant corporation's
internal documents were admissible against the defendant "as state of the art
evidence of the danger posed by the defendant's product").
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the same standards in strict liability cases as negligence cases,
whereas in other contexts it will not. In recent years, failure to warn
claims have become the most common type of product liability ac-
tion asserted. The most prevalent area in which these claims are as-
serted is in asbestos litigation.36 Due to the long latency period of
diseases that result from exposure to asbestos containing products,
pinpointing the knowledge of a manufacturer often becomes a cru-
cial element of the plaintiff's case. As such, the admissibility of state
of the art evidence is often vigorously contested.
Far more controversy arises when a litigant seeks to admit state
of the art evidence in a strict liability case than in a negligence
case .6 7 A natural impulse is to join any strict liability claim with a
parallel claim in negligence because courts are more likely to admit
state of the art evidence for negligence claims.368 Generally, courts
will permit state of the art evidence as to a negligence claim, even
though the strict liability claim would not support its admissibility.M
When this scenario occurs, a trial court generally must give careful
instructions to the jury and special verdicts that draw the jury's at-
tention away from the evidence as to the strict liability claim. 370 With
this in mind, a litigant can strategically set forth claims in negli-
gence if state of the art evidence works in its favor, but would other-
wise be inadmissible in a strict liability suit. Even though a manufac-
turers standard of care may be irrelevant to a strict liability claim, if
a plaintiff demonstrates evidence that the manufacturer could have
exercised greater care, a jury may be more sympathetic. Conversely,
if the manufacturer employed state of the art technology, a plaintiff
may want to avoid a claim of negligence to keep this evidence from
the jury.
366. Asbestos cases for failure to warn are the most prevalent type of case where
state of the art evidence is admissible. See LEE & LINDAHL. supra note 40, at
737.
367. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
368. See 3 Frumer & Friedman, supra note 3, § 18.03[3], at 18-57 ("While there
continue to be actions today brought only in negligence for various reasons,
in many states, it is more common for a plaintiff to sue in both negligence
and strict liability . ..").
369. See id. at 18-57 to 18-58 ("In those cases where negligence has been joined
with other causes of action, state-of-the-art evidence has been held to be ad-
missible as to the negligence claim, even though it would have been kept out
of evidence had the plaintiff made out a case in strict liability alone.").
370. See id. ("'[TIrial courts, through careful instructions and special verdicts, can
control the risk of jury confusion.- (quoting Landrigan v. Celotex Corp., 605
A.2d 1079, 1091 (NJ. 1992)).
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VI. RELEVANT BACKROUND TO ACANDS, INC. v. ASNER
Maryland courts have specifically admitted state of the art evi-
dence to determine a manufacturer's knowledge at the time of sale
in several asbestos cases371 prior to ACandS, Inc. v. Asner.372 There
are three areas addressed by the Asner court that this Comment has
not yet discussed. First, the defendants in Asner were non-
manufacturing installers and suppliers of products that contained
asbestos.373 Second, the injured parties in Asner were not direct users
of the defendants' product, but merely bystanders. Finally, the spe-
cific state of the art evidence that was at issue was peculiar to asbes-
tos. Each area requires brief development.
A. The Duty of Non-manufacturing Suppliers and Installers
Pursuant to section 388 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, a
non-manufacturing supplier or installer who supplies a product that
causes harm is liable only when it knows or has "reason to know"374
371. See Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp., 789 F.2d 1156, 1164-65 (4th Cir.
1986) (affirming a jury charge that included instructions on the state of the
art in an asbestos-based failure to warn case grounded in strict liability);
Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp. v. Garrett, 343 Md. 500, 548, 682 A.2d 1143,
1166-67 (1996) (noting the absence of state of the art evidence in failing to
find bad faith on the part of asbestos manufacturer in a strict liability failure
to warn case); ACandS, Inc. v. Godwin, 340 Md. 334, 378-82, 667 A.2d 116, 137-
39 (1995) (determining that the state of the art evidence at trial regarding an
asbestos manufacturer's and installer's knowledge prevented the plaintiffs' re-
covery of punitive damages); United States Gypsum Co. v. Mayor of Baltimore,
336 Md. 145, 163-69, 647 A.2d 405, 414-16 (1994) (affirming a jury verdict for
the plaintiffs based in part on state of the art evidence regarding an asbestos
manufacturer and installer in a strict liability failure to warn case); Eagle-
Picher Indus., Inc. v. Balbos, 326 Md. 179, 194-97, 604 A.2d 445, 452-53 (1992)
(permitting an asbestos manufacturer to present the state of the art evidence
regarding asbestos-related diseases); ACandS, Inc. v. Abate, 121 Md. App. 590,
614-15, 710 A.2d 944, 956 (1998) (noting the importance of state of the art ev-
idence in a strict liability failure to warn case).
372. 344 Md. 155, 163-70, 686 A.2d 250, 254-57 (1996) (finding reversible error in
the trial court's refusal to admit state of the art evidence in an asbestos-related
strict liability failure to warn case).
373. See id.
374. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 12(1) (1965). Section 12(1) provides:
The words "reason to know" are used throughout the Restatement of
this Subject to denote the fact that the actor has information from
which a person of reasonable intelligence or of superior intelligence
of the actor would infer that the fact in question exists, or that such
person would govern his conduct upon the assumption that such fact
exists.
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of the dangers in using a product as intended,3 75 has reason to be-
lieve that those supplied with the product are not aware of the
product's dangerous condition, 76 and fails to inform the consumer
of the product's dangerous propensity.377 However, when the non-
manufacturing supplier is "something more than a conduit," 378 the
supplier will be held to the heightened "should have known" stan-
dard that is normally reserved for manufacturers.37 9
In Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. v. Balbos,38° the Court of Appeals of
Maryland delineated the appropriate knowledge standard to be ap-
plied to non-manufacturing suppliers and installers of asbestos
products in negligence cases.38' Porter-Hayden, an installer of asbes-
tos insulation, argued that plaintiffs needed to prove that Porter-
Hayden knew or had "reason to know" of the dangers of asbestos to
bystanders. 38 2 The Balbos court reiterated the holding in Telak v.
Maszczenski, 383 in which the court of appeals announced that a mere
"conduit" supplier is held to the lesser standard of "reason to
know."384
The Balbos court, however, held that Porter-Hayden, as an in-
staller and dealer in asbestos insulation, was more than a mere con-
duit supplier, and therefore subject to the "should have known"
standard. 385 The court held that Porter-Hayden should have known,
and thus warned, of the dangers of asbestos because, as an installer
and supplier of asbestos products, Porter-Hayden was peculiarly
aware of the dangers associated with asbestos. 386
Id.
375. See id. § 388.
376. See id.
377. See id.
378. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Balbos, 326 Md. 179, 202, 604 A.2d 445, 456
(1992).
379. See id. at 200, 604 A.2d at 455.
380. 326 Md. 179, 604 A.2d 445 (1992).
381. See id. at 194-204, 604 A.2d at 452-57.
382. Id. at 198, 604 A.2d at 454 (citations omitted).
383. 248 Md. 476, 487, 237 A.2d 434, 440 (1968) (holding that the seller of a swim-
ming pool, who was only a distributor, was not liable for a diver's injuries).
384. Bathos, 326 Md. at 202-03, 604 A.2d at 456.
384. See id. at 203.04, 604 A.2d at 457.
386. See id. This finding is in accord with previous case law, which held that "a ven-
dor, like a manufacturer, is subject to liability if, although ignorant of the
dangerous character or condition, he could have by the exercise of reasonable
care discovered it by utilizing the peculiar opportunity and competence which
he has or should have as a dealer in such chattels." Id. at 200, 604 A.2d at 455
(quoting Woolley v. Uebelhor, 239 Md. 318, 325, 211 A.2d 302, 306 (1965) (cit-
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In light of this precedent, it was not surprising that the defend-
ants in Asner, who were suppliers and installers of asbestos contain-
ing products, did not dispute being held to the same standard of
knowledge as manufacturers. 37 What was disputed, however, was the
particular level of knowledge that the defendants had regarding the
exposure to their product by bystanders. At the center of this dis-
pute was the issue of forseeability.
B. Injuries to Bystanders
In many of the cases previously discussed, the injured party was
a direct user of the product. In Asner, the injured parties did not di-
rectly use the asbestos-containing products-they did not cut, in-
stall, or work in any direct way with the products.388 Rather, the in-
juries complained of were a result of the injured parties' exposure
to the dust created by the asbestos-containing products while others
were using, installing, or mixing them.389 Products liability law labels
these types of injured parties bystanders.
The Restatement (Second) section 402A speaks in terms of users
and consumers.390 The Restatement (Second) explicitly refrained from
expressing an opinion as to the issue of liability to a bystander that
is harmed by a defective product.391 Determining whether the harm
caused to a bystander3 92 due to exposure to the defendant's product
ing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965))).
387. See ACandS, Inc. v. Asner, 344 Md. 155, 168 n.1, 686 A.2d 250, 256 n.1 (1996).
388. See ACandS, Inc. v. Asner, 104 Md. App. 608, 617-19, 657 A.2d 379, 384-85
(1995), rev'd, 344 Md. 155, 686 A.2d 250 (1996).
389. See id.
390. See RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) ("One who sells any prod-
uct in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or
to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the
ultimate user or consumer, or to his property .. ") (emphasis added).
391. See id. cmt. o. Comment o explains:
Casual bystanders, and others who may come into contact with the
product, as in the case of employees of the retailer, or a passer-by in-
jured by an exploding bottle, or a pedestrian hit by an automobile,
have been denied recovery. There may be no essential reason why
such plaintiffs should not be brought within the scope of the protec-
tion afforded, other than that they do not have the same reasons for
expecting such protection as the consumer who buys a marketed
product .... The Institute expresses neither approval nor disap-
proval of expansion of the rule to permit recovery by such persons.
Id.
392. Although no formal definition of bystander has been established by Maryland
courts, Eagie-Picher Indus., Inc. implicitly defined the plaintiffs as persons who
had not "worked directly with asbestos products" and thus were "bystanders."
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is recoverable requires a fact-specific inquiry.393 Courts will scrutinize
the interrelationship between the use of the defendant's product
and the activities of the bystander to determine whether the harm
caused was forseeable.394
As in the early line of duty to warn negligence cases, the Court
of Appeals of Maryland in Eagle-Picher Indus. v. Balboi395 addressed
this issue of foreseeability of harm to bystanders. 396 Balbos was a
sheet metal worker who worked in an area that was heavily exposed
to asbestos dust and fibers for prolonged periods of time.39 The
manufacturer, Eagle-Picher, asserted that the available knowledge at
the time of the bystanders' exposure to asbestos products did not
adequately alert it of the correlation between asbestos and mesothe-
lioma398 in bystanders. 399 Thus, the manufacturer claimed it had no
duty to warn the bystanders of the risks of exposure because the
harm they suffered was not foreseeable.4 ° However, the court found
sufficient evidence to show that Eagle-Picher knew or should have
known that asbestos exposure may result in some form of lung dis-
ease.401 The court also found that there was sufficient evidence to al-
low a jury to find that Porter-Hayden had a duty to warn bystanders
of the dangers of asbestos.4°2
See Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Balbos, 326 Md. 179, 210, 604 A.2d 445, 460
(1992); see also BLACK'S LAw DIcrIONARY 201 (6th ed. 1990) (defining bystander
as "one who stands near").
393. See Eagle-Picher Indus., 326 Md. at 210, 604 A.2d at 460.
394. See id. The court further stated that to find a substantial factor causation, the
physical characteristics of the workplace and the relationship between that ac-
tivities of the direct users of the product and a bystander plaintiff must be un-
derstood. See id.; see also Rotondo v. Keene Corp., 956 F.2d 436, 438-39 (3d Cir.
1992) (describing and considering the effects of the working environment of
the injured bystander as being six to eight feet from the pipecoverers as they
placed asbestos covering on pipes).
395. 326 Md. 179, 604 A.2d 445 (1992).
396. See id. at 196-97, 604 A.2d at 453.
397. See id. at 205, 213, 604 A.2d at 457, 461.
398. Caused almost exclusively by asbestos exposure, mesothelioma is an extremely
rare form of cancer that affects the chest or abdomen. See 4A ROSCOE N. GRAY
& LouIsE J. GORDY, AirORNEYs' TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE 205C.72 (3d ed. 1989).
399. See Eag/e-Picher Indus., 326 Md. at 196, 604 A.2d at 453.
400. See id.
401. See id. at 197, 604 A.2d at 453.
402. See id. at 204, 604 A.2d at 457 (discussing the prior work experience of
Porter's founders, as well as the near exclusiveness of the company's dealing
in asbestos products).
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As with other strict liability actions, state of the art evidence as-
sists the plaintiff in determining what unreasonable dangers were
foreseeable at the time of sale.4°3 Specifically, comment j to section
402A states that "the seller is required to give warning against [an
unreasonable danger], if he has knowledge or by the application of
reasonable, developed human skill and foresight should have knowl-
edge, of the presence of the ingredient and danger."4 Therefore,
state of the art evidence is relevant to demonstrate the risks that the
asbestos containing products, which the defendant supplied and in-
stalled, posed to the bystanders.4
In ACandS, Inc. v. Asner,i 6 the primary issue was whether state
of the art evidence about threshold limit values ("TLVs) could be
used by the defense to rebut plaintiff's evidence of actual knowl-
edge. °7 The court of appeals held that the opinion of the trial
court and the court of special appeals required reversal because the
defendant's TLV evidence was improperly excluded. 4°8 Thus, the
court reversed on the issues relating to liability.
4 °9
C. Threshold Limit Values
A TLV is a guideline for the maximum amount of airborne
contaminants that emanate from a product, averaged over the
course of an eight-hour day, to which an individual may safely be
exposed.410 The theory is that if airborne dust can be maintained
under a certain level, asbestos-related diseases will be avoided.
411
The United States Public Health Service conducted research at tex-
tile plants, and in 1938 proposed that the TLV for asbestos dust ex-
posure should be placed at five million particles per cubic foot (5
MPPCF).41 The 5 MPPCF guideline was based on the impinger air
403. See PRODUCTS LIABILITY PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 28, 15.08[6], at 15-129.
404. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. j (1965).
405. See ACandS, Inc. v. Asner, 344 Md. 155, 168, 686 A.2d 250, 256 (1996); cf
Robb, supra note 3, at 13-14.
406. 344 Md. 155, 686 A.2d 250 (1996).
407. See id. at 163, 686 A.2d at 253.
408. See id at 170, 178-79, 686 A.2d at 257, 261.
409. See id. at 170, 686 A.2d at 257.
410. See BmARY I. CAsTLEMAN, ASBESTOS: MEDICAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS 192 (1984).
411. See ACandS, Inc. v. Godwin, 340 Md. 334, 365, 667 A.2d 116, 130 (1995) (dis-
cussing the opinion held by groups, including the American Conference of
Governmental Industrial Hygienists, that asbestos-caused diseases, mainly as-
bestosis, could generally be avoided if dust in the work environment could be
kept below a certain limit).
412. See CAmEMAN, supra note 410, at 202.
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supply method, which measured the total dust count rather than a
measure of just asbestos fibers.413
In 1946, the American Conference of Governmental Industrial
Hygienists (ACGIH), a non-government organization of local, state,
and federal health officials, adopted the 5 MPPCF as the TLV for
airborne asbestos fibers.414 For twenty-six years the 5 MPPCF TLV re-
mained the standard concerning acceptable exposure to friable as-
bestos. In 1968 and again in 1970, the ACGIH indicated an intent
to change the TLV and the means by which a new TLV would be
measured. 4 5 In 1972, the first federal regulation of TLV's for asbes-
tos-containing products was adopted; this regulation was more strin-
gent than the 5 MPPCF measure.416
D. Facts of the Instant Case
Zalma Asner was employed as an outside machinist at Bethle-
hem Steel's Key Highway Shipyard from 1941 to 1982.417 Charles F.
Wilson worked at the Allegany Ballistics Laboratory from 1946 to
1975.418 Milton W. Payne worked as an electrician at the Fairfield
Shipyard during World War II.4 19 All three died from mesothe-
lioma.420 Personal representatives of the deceased workers brought
negligence and strict liability failure to warn actions against various
manufacturers and supplier/installation contractors.421 With the ex-
ception of ACandS, Inc. and Porter-Hayden, all other defendants ei-
ther settled, sought protection under the Bankruptcy Code, or were
dismissed prior to trial.422
The jury returned verdicts against ACandS, Inc. and Porter-
Hayden for both compensatory and punitive damages.423 The trial
court entered judgment and an appeal followed. 424 The Court of
413. See id. at 204.
414. See id. at 211.
415. See Godwin, 340 Md. at 365, 667 A.2d at 131.
416. See id. In 1969, the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act adopted a 12 fiber per
cubic centimeter standard (12f/cc) for airborne asbestos exposure. See id In
1972, the Occupational Safety and Health Act mandated an eight hour time-
weighted standard of 5f/cc. See id
417. See ACandS, Inc. v. Asner, 344 Md. 155, 161, 686 A.2d 250, 253 (1996).
418. See id. at 162, 686 A.2d at 253.
419. See id.
420. See id. at 161, 686 A.2d at 253.
421. See id. at 161-62, 686 A.2d at 253.
422. See id.
423. See id. at 162, 686 A.2d at 253.
424. See ACandS, Inc. v. Asner, 104 Md. App. 608, 654-55, 657 A.2d 379, 402 (1995),
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Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed the judgments, whereupon
the court of appeals granted certiorai. 425
E. The Tial
At trial, during cross-examination, the defendants were able to
elicit testimony that there was a tentative TLV of 5 MPPCF, as per
the Dreesen report.426 The defendants, however, wanted to intro-
duce through their own state of the art evidence that the Dreesen
report was for total particles of dust rather than just for asbestos. 427
The defendant's state of the art evidence was an attempt to rebut
the plaintiff's evidence in order to demonstrate that all of the medi-
cal data available to the defendant at the time the defendant dis-
tributed its product was insufficient to impute knowledge on the
defendant's behalf that would create a duty to warn of the product's
harmful characteristics as to bystanders.428 However, the trial court
concluded that the jury had heard the appropriate state of the art
evidence, and the limitation of the Dreesen report, which the de-
fendants hoped to introduce, was not relevant. 429 On appeal,
ACandS, Inc. and Porter-Hayden argued that the exclusion of evi-
dence concerning TLVs by the trial court was improper and
prejudiced their case.43°
F The Court of Special Appeals Affirms
The court of special appeals first addressed whether the plain-
tiffs put forth ample evidence to impose a judgment for punitive
damages.431 By doing so, the court foreclosed itself from objectively
viewing defendants' proffered testimony as to state of the art evi-
dence. In looking at the punitive damage awards, the court found
that plaintiffs' evidence clearly indicated that ACandS, Inc. was
aware that asbestosis was an increasing problem among its employ-
ees during the 1950s and 1960s, yet ACandS, Inc. failed to place
rev'd, 344 Md. 155, 686 A.2d 250 (1996).
425. See Asner, 344 Md. at 161, 686 A.2d at 253.
426. See Asner, 104 Md. App. at 640, 657 A.2d at 395.
427. See Asner, 344 Md. at 169, 686 A.2d at 257 (addressing the Dreesen report's
limited applicability, as it was for total dust in textile mills).
428. See id. at 164, 686 A.2d at 254 (criticizing the court of special appeals's reason-
ing which affirmed the lower court's decision that excluded the defendant's
TLC evidence).
429. See Asner, 104 Md. App. 608, 657 A.2d at 395.
430. See Asner, 344 Md. at 163-70, 686 A.2d at 254-57.
431. See Asner, 104 Md. App. at 619-37, 657 A.2d at 385-94.
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warning labels on its asbestos products.432 Similarly, the court of spe-
cial appeals held that Porter-Hayden's actions constituted actual
malice supported by clear and convincing evidence. 433 It was these
findings of evidence to support the imposition of punitive damages
that led the court to conclude that actual knowledge of the risks of
asbestos had been proven.
434
Looking to the standard enunciated in Zenobia, the court of
special appeals rationalized that, in a strict liability failure to warn
case the plaintiff need only show what the defendant knew or
should have known, and that state of the art is only pertinent when
the plaintiff attempts to prove the should have known compo-
nent.435 Therefore, "once a defendant's actual knowledge is shown,
state of the art evidence is not necessary to show what the defend-
ant 'should have known' or 'could have known."
436
G. The Court of Appeals Reverses
The court of appeals held that exclusion of defendants' TLV
evidence was an error and prejudicial. 437 As the court of appeals ex-
plained, "[t]he error complained of lies in excluding from the
jury's consideration evidence that is relevant because it tends to
counter or rebut plaintiffs' evidence as to negligence, strict liability,
and punitive damages." 438 The court stated that TLV evidence was
relevant for expert determination of when bystander exposure to
appellants' asbestos products was dangerous. 439
The later the experts knew of the dangers, "the more that find-
ing. . . would . . .reduce . . .the duration of a claimant's exposure
after unreasonable dangerousness to bystanders was known." 440
VII. ANALYSIS OF THE ASNER COURT'S DECISION
The decision in Asner is one that is fair and favorable to manu-
facturers, suppliers, and installers of asbestos products. It leveled
432. See id at 631, 657 A.2d at 391.
433. See id. at 632-37, 657 A.2d at 391-94.
434. See id. at 639, 657 A.2d at 395.
435. See id. at 638, 657 A.2d at 394.
436. Id. at 639, 657 A.2d at 394.
437. See Asner, 344 Md. at 170, 686 A.2d at 257.
438. Id. at 164, 686 A.2d at 254.
439. See id. at 167, 686 A.2d at 256.
440. Id. at 167-68, 686 A.2d at 256. The court then provided some general observa-
tions concerning substantial factor causation and the role that evidence of
non-party exposure plays in determining causation in asbestos bystander cases.
See id. at 170-77, 686 A.2d at 257-61.
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the playing field. Thus, even when the plaintiff has attempted to
demonstrate that the defendant had actual knowledge of the gen-
eral hazards of a product, state of the art evidence is admissible to
rebut that showing."' Moreover, the Asner court's opinion solidifies
what other courts have concluded-when a plaintiff has the oppor-
tunity to admit state of the art evidence, so shall the defense. Al-
lowing only the plaintiffs to admit state of the art evidence does in-
deed provide the jury with an incomplete picture of what was
known and when it was known by the expert community. 4 2 Further-
more, the court indicated that evidence of TLVs is relevant irrespec-
tive of whether the defendants knew what experts in the field
knew."3
TLV evidence is not a fabricated piece of evidence designed to
exculpate "corporate killers." Rather, evidence of TLVs is relevant
and necessary because it shows that, even if people in the industry
were aware of asbestos' potential hazards, manufacturers and suppli-
ers still believed and had reason to believe that asbestos exposures
under certain levels were safe. Precluding defendants from putting
on their state of the art evidence would permit plaintiffs to offer
testimony that all exposures, regardless of the dosage, lead to asbes-
tos-related diseases. Such a view mischaracterizes what was known
about occupational asbestos exposure and fails to take into account
all state of the art evidence. 4"
The belief that there were safe dosages of asbestos was predi-
cated on the surveys and research undertaken by health profession-
als during the 1930s and 1940s. 445 Manufacturers relied upon the
Public Health Service's and ACGIH's adoption of the asbestos TLV
of 5 MPPCF 4"6 Furthermore, those scientific studies focused on tex-
tile workers who worked with pure asbestos in high concentrations,
not occupational users such as the Asner plaintiffs."7 The threat of
injury to textile workers, as well as asbestos miners, was much more
palpable based on their high exposure levels. Logic dictated that
the occupational user's risk of contracting asbestos-related diseases
was reduced because of their lower, more permissible, asbestos dos-
ages. The concept that there are permissible levels of exposure is a
441. See Asner, 104 Md. App. at 164, 686 A.2d at 254.
442. See id. at 168, 686 A.2d at 256.
443. See id. at 167, 686 A.2d at 256.
444. See supra notes 438-40 and accompanying text.
445. See supra notes 410-16 and accompanying text.
446. See Asner, 344 Md. at 169, 686 A.2d at 257.
447. See supra notes 417-19 and accompanying text.
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touchstone of science which recognizes the relationship between po-
tential toxins and doses. This is not an attempt to trivialize the dan-
gers of asbestos exposure, but rather emphasizes the notion that de-
ductive reasoning is premised upon measuring the correlation
between various factors. Such was the case between exposures below
a TLV of 5 MPPCF and asbestos-related diseases.
ACandS, Inc. v. Asne" suggests that trial courts should be more
flexible in ruling on the admissibility of state of the art evidence. A
court's central concern should be whether the proffered evidence
tends to illustrate what was known about the dangers of asbestos
during the time period in which the plaintiff was exposed. Likewise,
Asner indicates that state of the art evidence is always admissible to
rebut a plaintiffs showing of knowledge, even where the showing
amounts to actual knowledge, because state of the art evidence-
particularly testimony as to TLVs-is part of a defendant's knowl-
edge. The importance of this decision is that it rounds out the pres-
entation of evidence and thus serves to level the evidentiary playing
field.
VIII. CONCLUSION
A few generalizations can be drawn from the preceding discus-
sion. First, it is far more likely that a court will accept state of the
art evidence in a negligence cause of action than in one sounding
in strict liability. Second, courts dealing with strict liability failure to
warn cases are apt to permit state of the art evidence because of the
negligence principles grafted onto section 402A through commentj.
Third, when a plaintiff presents state of the art evidence, it is more
conceivable that a defendant will be permitted to present its own
state of the art evidence. Fourth, when a plaintiff asserts that a feasi-
ble alternative design existed, a court is more likely to permit a
defendant to present state of the art evidence to rebut this charge.
Finally, courts in jurisdictions such as Maryland, that have no codi-
fied version of a state of the art defense, will be far less inclined to
allow a defendant's proof that it employed the state of the art in its
product to create an absolute defense.
The drafters of the Restatement (Third) have taken the view that
strict liability will exist in manufacturing defect cases and only those
design defect cases in which the product itself fails to perform a
manifestly intended function. Thus, negligence principles control
most product liability causes of action. If Maryland adopts this view
448. 344 Md. 155, 686 A.2d 250 (1996).
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it may lead to more liberal admittance of state of the art evidence.
While many of the positions in the new Restatement have been criti-
cized and characterized as a tort reform project, a close examina-
tion reveals that in many instances, it has accurately restated Mary-
land law. Where differences exist, change may be wise for "the
common law is not static; its life and heart is its dynamism-its abil-
ity to keep pace with the world while constantly searching for just
and fair solutions to pressing societal problems." 449
Patrick R. Buckler
449. Kelley v. R.G. Indus., 304 Md. 124, 140, 497 A.2d 1143, 1150 (1985) (quoting
Harrison v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 442, 460, 456 A.2d 894
(1983)).
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